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ABSTRACT
Government provision of land and natural resources has
provoked major trade disputes over the issue of subsidies. Yet, how
to identify the existence of a subsidy when the government is the
sole or predominant provider—a common phenomenon due to the
government control of natural resources in many countries—
remains unsettled under the law of the World Trade Organization.
At the heart of the controversy is the issue of benchmarking. Since
the normal benchmark of domestic market prices cannot be properly
utilized when the market price is the government monopoly price,
it becomes necessary to resort to alternative benchmarks. Although
the WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) has articulated certain principles
and made some suggestions, what has prevailed in practice is the
use of external market prices as the benchmark in identifying a
subsidy in the country of provision. This approach, however,
disregards the most basic source of comparative advantage of a
trading nation: its natural endowment.
This Article makes several contributions. First, it traces the
drafting history of relevant WTO rules and attempts to discover the
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rationale of an abandoned proposal that would have completely
changed the legal landscape on the issue of government monopoly
and subsidies.
Second, it systemically examines WTO
benchmarking jurisprudence, which has evolved through multiple
cases involving Canadian softwood lumber, Indian minerals,
Indonesian timber, and Chinese land. Third, it highlights the
concept of resource rent and analyzes how the treatment of resource
rent in the system of public ownership might affect the application
of WTO subsidy regulation. Finally, it proposes the alternative of
constructing domestic market benchmarks on the basis of optimal
use of natural resources via economic modeling, which may have
broad implications for dealing with the special problem of
subsidization in China.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Market benchmarking is at the heart of subsidy disciplines of the
World Trade Organization. Under the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM”), a subsidy is
deemed to exist only if a government’s financial contribution confers
to the recipient a “benefit,” the existence of which is to be identified
by comparing it to a chosen benchmark.1 For governmental
provision of equity, loans, loan guarantees, and goods or services,
the basis for comparison is the marketplace; that is, what the
recipient could have obtained in the market without the government
contribution at issue—a counterfactual situation. Despite the
inherent difficulty in constructing counterfactuals, WTO
adjudicators have established a set of legal positions on market
benchmarking.2
In one area, however, the legal position on benchmarking
remains largely unsettled. That is where the government is the sole
provider, or monopolistic supplier, of goods or services. In such a
situation, the market price is the price charged by the government,
hence that price cannot logically be the basis for comparison. The
question of how to construct the benchmark in such a situation has
arisen in several WTO cases involving, respectively, governmentowned timber, minerals, and land.3 Notably, while the position of
the WTO Appellate Body has shifted between the two cases it has
reviewed, the benchmark positions taken by WTO panels in the
other cases were not appealed, which means similar rulings may be
rejected or modified by the Appellate Body in future cases.
This Article seeks to analyze the benchmarking problem in the
context of government monopoly over the provision of natural
resources, including timber, minerals, and land. The Article focuses
on natural resources, rather than all products and services provided
by government monopoly, for the following reasons: Unlike
manufactured goods or services, land and other fixed natural
1 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM].
2 See SCM Agreement—Article 14 (Jurisprudence), WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX:
GUIDE
TO
WTO
LAW
AND
PRACTICE,
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/subsidies_art14_jur.
pdf. [https://perma.cc/THR7-2WFF] (describing methods used by the
investigating authority to calculate subsidy amounts).
3 See generally supra Part 2.2.
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resources are the “natural endowment” of a nation, thus
representing the most basic type of comparative advantage in trade.
Besides, the price of natural resources typically carries rent, which
merits special consideration. Furthermore, government pricing of
natural resources is typically linked to the public policies on
environmental protection and sustainable development. In short,
the special characteristics of land and natural resources warrant
special consideration in benchmarking.
At the outset, it is necessary to recognize that the notion of a
market benchmark is a legal construct of WTO subsidy disciplines.
It assumes the existence of a fully competitive market, in which
prices are determined by supply and demand, free from
government intervention. It further assumes that there is one
market price for the good or service at issue that is objectively
determinable. In reality, no such ideal market exists, and no single
market price can be objectively determined.4 Indeed, from an
economic perspective, it is doubtful that the existing WTO
regulation is ever capable of identifying government subsidization
in any meaningful sense.5 Recognizing the legal nature of the
benchmarking enterprise, however, should not lead to the
conclusion that all benchmark decisions are ad hoc or inherently
arbitrary. Rather, it should help us realize that each judgment on
benchmarking embodies a policy choice—it reflects the vision of the
adjudicators on the role of the government in the national economy
and the proper reach of global governance. This realization should
in turn inspire us to explore ways to improve the legal construct of
the market benchmark, so it will serve the world trade system in a
more secure and predictable manner. While this Article focuses on
the government provision of natural resources, hopefully the
analysis herein can also shed light on benchmarking in a broader
context, that is, government monopoly in the provision of all
products and services.
4 See Andrew Lang, Governing ‘As If’: Global Subsidies Regulation and the
Benchmark Problem, 67 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 135–68 (2014) (discussing the inherent
indeterminacy of market benchmarks); Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of (Perfect)
Market Benchmarks: The Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1–54
(2010) (critiquing the market benchmark approach in US countervailing duty law).
5 See Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A
Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 473, 474 (2010); see also Alan O. Sykes,
The Limited Economic Case for Subsidies Regulation, E15 INITIATIVE (Mar. 2015),
http://e15initiative.org/publications/the-limited-economic-case-for-subsidiesregulation/ [https://perma.cc/6HZR-5Y2W].
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The Article will proceed as follows: Part II introduces the subject
of government monopoly and WTO subsidy regulation. It will
review relevant SCM rules, the drafting history thereof, and the
major WTO cases establishing SCM benchmark jurisprudence, and
highlight unresolved issues concerning the government provision of
natural resources. Part III proposes two alternative approaches to
benchmarking in the case of government monopoly of natural
resources. One is the construction of domestic benchmarks based
on production costs, applying the basic economic theory of rent to
the cost of production in natural resources. The other is the
construction of domestic benchmarks on the basis of optimal use of
natural resources, requiring the use of economic modeling to
estimate the proper prices for the efficient allocation of natural
resources. Part IV sets out the key conclusions of this study.
2. GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY UNDER WTO SUBSIDY REGULATION
2.1. SCM Rules and Government Monopoly
The SCM Agreement establishes WTO’s comprehensive
disciplines on government subsidies. Under the SCM Agreement, a
subsidy is deemed to exist when there is “a financial contribution”
or “any form of income or price support” by the government, and
“a benefit is thereby conferred.”6 The “financial contribution” by a
government is specified to be: (i) a government practice that
involves a direct transfer or potential direct transfer of funds or
liabilities (e.g., grants, loans, equity infusion, and loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue otherwise due is foregone (e.g., tax
incentives); (iii) government provisions of goods or services other
than general infrastructure, or government purchases of goods; (iv)
government entrusting or directing a private body to carry out any
type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii).7
The issue of subsidy by government monopoly falls generally
under type (iii), that is, where the government is the sole provider

SCM, supra note 1, art. 1.1.
Id. The SCM definition of subsidy has been criticized as being too narrow.
See Gary Horlick & Peggy A. Clarke, Rethinking Subsidy Disciplines for the Future:
Policy Options for Reform, 20 J. INT’L ECON. REV. 673–703 (2017).
6
7
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of goods or services other than general infrastructure.8 For the
government provision of goods or services to be a subsidy, it must
confer “a benefit” to the recipient. The identification and calculation
of such “benefit” is to be made by following the guidelines set out
in SCM Article 14(d):
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods
by a government shall not be considered as conferring a
benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than
adequate remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good
or service in question in the country of provision or purchase
(including price, quality, availability, marketability,
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).9
Thus, whether the government provision of goods or services
confers a benefit is to be determined by reference to “prevailing
market conditions” in the country of provision. In other words, the
prevailing market conditions in the country of provision should be
the benchmark for measuring the adequacy of remuneration
received by the government.
2.1.1. The Circularity Problem
A problem arises, however, when the government is the sole
provider of the good or service in question. In that case, it would be
circular to compare the remuneration received by the government
with the market price prevailing in that country for the good or
service in question, as the market price is the price charged by the
sole government provider.
It should be noted that government monopoly in the provision
of goods or services is a common phenomenon in the modern world.
Under the laws of many countries, the state owns all the natural
resources within its territory, hence the government (national or
subnational) is the sole provider of natural resources. Such
countries range from developed economies such as Canada and

8
When the government is the sole purchaser of goods or services, it is
monopsony.
9
SCM, supra note 1, art. 14(d) (emphasis added).
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Australia,10 to developing economies such as Mexico, Brazil and
India,11 to former centrally-planned economies such as China,
Vietnam and Mongolia.12 With respect to services, government
monopoly is quite common in postal services, public utilities, and
telecommunications, although some of these services may qualify as
“general infrastructure,” and hence may be excluded from the
definition of financial contribution under SCM Article 1.1.
It should also be noted that the concern over monopoly is
typically the high prices that a monopoly may charge, not low prices
resulting from government subsidies. In international trade, the
chief concern has been that a government import monopoly may
mark up the price of an imported product to protect domestic
producers of like product. To prevent such markups, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) imposes certain limits on
the margin a government import monopoly may charge on
imports.13 Although an export monopoly may also mark up the
10
About 89% of Canada’s land is Crown land, which is owned by either
federal or provincial governments. See V.P. Neimanis, Crown Land, CAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/Article/crownland [https://perma.cc/95AJ-DTBU] (last updated Dec. 16, 2013) (“Less than 11%
of Canada’s land is in private hands; 41% is federal crown land and 48% is
provincial crown land.”). Ownership of Australia’s mineral natural resources vests
with its states and territories. Andrew D. Mitchell & Jessica Casben, Natural
Resources and Energy Regulation in Australia: The Energy White Paper Context, in
EMERGING ISSUES IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND
POLICY RELATING TO NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 9–10
(Mitsuo Matsushita & Thomas Schoenbaum eds., 2016). Thus, the states and
territories regulate access to these resources and set costs for access and exploitation
(on private lands as well as public lands). Id.
11
Ownership of all-natural resources is vested in the nation, as stipulated in
Article 27 of the Constitution of Mexico. Similarly, mineral resources and many
other natural resources are “property of the Union,” as specified in Article 20 of the
Constitution of Brazil. While ownership structure is more complex in India, “there
can be no private ownership of natural resources, and any involvement by the
private sector is limited to exploration, prospecting and exploration of these
resources for specified time periods.” R.V. Anuradha & Piyush Joshi, Natural
Resources Regime in India: Impact on Trade and Investment, in EMERGING ISSUES IN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO
NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 60 (Mitsuo Matsushita &
Thomas Schoenbaum eds., 2016).
12 See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 9, 10 (1982, as amended) (China); HIẾN PHÁP
NƯỚC CỘNG HÒA XÃ HỘI CHỦ NGHĨA VIỆT NAM [CONSTITUTION] art. 53 (2013) (Viet.);
MONGOL ULSĪN ÜNDSEN HÚLĬ [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (1992) (Mong.).
13 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. II:4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (limiting the margin that an import
monopoly may charge to the level of tariff findings); id. art. XVII:4(b) (imposing an
obligation to report “the import mark-up” by an import monopoly on products not
subject to tariff bindings).
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prices of exports so as to protect domestic users and to reduce
supply to foreign users, there is no specific GATT rule regulating the
pricing of exports by government monopolies.14 GATT does
obligate all state trading enterprises, including import and export
monopolies established or authorized by the government, to act in
accordance with the nondiscrimination principle in their trading
activities,15 but the obligation is very difficult to enforce due to the
lack of transparency in the operation of state enterprises. In any
event, GATT regulation of a government monopoly is limited to
trading activity and does not extend to subsidies.16
By contrast, the concern with government monopoly under the
SCM Agreement is that the government monopoly may charge too
low a price for its goods or services. The SCM Agreement, however,
fails to address the situation of government monopoly specifically.
As a result, in order to avoid the circularity problem under Article
14(d), it becomes necessary to construct the benchmark in
determining the adequacy of government prices. But how should
such a benchmark be constructed? Should it be based on the price
that a private monopoly would charge, or the price the government
could receive in a fully competitive market? Should the cost of the
government provision be considered? Before examining how WTO
adjudicators have approached the problem, it is enlightening to
review the solution once contemplated by the drafters of the SCM
Agreement.
2.1.2. Draft SCM Article 14(e): A Mystery
It turns out that the drafters of the SCM Agreement did consider
the situation of government monopoly in the provision of goods or
services, as well as that of government monopsony in purchasing
14 See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization art. 31(1)(a),
Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (recognizing these effects of export
monopoly). The lack of GATT rules on export monopoly pricing is not surprising,
given the lack of commitments on export tariff bindings generally under GATT.
15
GATT, supra note 13, art. XVII:1(a).
16
In fact, GATT Article II:4 (concerning import monopoly) states that its
provision “shall not limit the use by contracting parties of any form of assistance to
domestic producers . . . .” Id. art. II:4. Moreover, GATT Ad Article XVII effectively
excludes the “privileges granted [by government] for the exploitation of national
natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise control
over the trading activities of the enterprise in question” from the nondiscrimination
obligation of state trading enterprises. Id. Ad art. XVII:1(a).
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goods or services and offered a definitive answer. The initial draft
of SCM Article 14, when it first appeared in late 1990 during the
Uruguay Round negotiations, contained substantially the same
provisions as the current Article 14, plus one additional paragraph
(e).17
The draft Article 14(e) provides:
(e) When the government is the sole provider or purchaser
of the good or service in question, the provision or purchase
of such good or service shall not be considered as conferring
a benefit, unless the government discriminates among users
or providers of the good or service. Discrimination shall not
include differences in treatment between users or providers
of such goods or services due to normal commercial
considerations.18
Thus, Article 14(e) took the position that government monopoly
and monopsony should not be considered as providing a subsidy,
so long as the government did not discriminate between domestic
and foreign buyers or sellers. Today, such a position might seem
rather radical, especially in light of the SCM jurisprudence on
government monopoly subsequently developed under Article 14(d),
as will be discussed below.
It appears that the provision of Article 14(e) was derived from
proposals made by the United States in the negotiating group on
The
Subsidy and Natural Resources-Based Products.19
nondiscrimination requirement in Article 14(e) targeted
government’s two-tier pricing in natural resource sectors. Two-tier
pricing occurs when the government owns or controls the
production of natural resources and provides them to domestic
manufacturers at below world market prices.20 For example,
PEMEX, Mexico’s state-owned oil and gas monopoly, sold its
products to domestic producers at lower prices than those charged

17
GATT Secretariat, Group of Negotiations on Goods, Negotiating Group on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Draft Text by the Chairman, GATT Doc.
MTN/GNG/NG10/W/38/Rev.2, at 23 (Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Draft SCM
Text].
18 Id.
19 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) 502–
3, 942 n. 736 (Terence Stewart ed., 1993).
20 Id. at 501.
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to foreign customers.21 Such two-tier pricing was considered to
result in a form of subsidy to domestic producers.
The negotiation record shows that Mexico opposed Article 14(e)
as drafted and proposed adding the phrase “within its territory”
after “unless the government discriminates,” so that the
nondiscrimination requirement would apply to domestic producers
only.22 Obviously, Mexico’s proposal would have defeated the
purpose of preventing two-tier pricing. Nonetheless, the rationale
provided by Mexico for its proposal is noteworthy. According to
Mexico,
[Draft Article 14(e) means that] countries endowed with
natural resources renounce their comparative advantages, or
otherwise that they be exposed to the application of
countervailing measures in their export markets. This means
that National Treatment is applied beyond the territory of
contracting parties, which is fundamentally inconsistent
with this basic GATT concept.23
The reference to comparative advantage based on naturalresource endowment may have reflected the thinking behind the
main sentence of Article 14(e). Except for this reference by Mexico,
no other explanation can be found in the negotiation records
regarding the rationale behind Article 14(e).24
Article 14(e) was deleted in the Draft SCM Agreement of
December 20, 1991 (the Dunkel Draft), apparently as a result of
Mexico’s opposition.25 Other than the issue of two-tier pricing, the
negotiation records do not contain any discussion on the provision
of Article 14(e).
In subsequent WTO practice, the position taken in Article 14(e)
has neither been discussed, nor followed. Yet, Article 14(e) is not
merely a historical note for WTO scholars. As the discussion below
will show, the general idea of Article 14(e) has the support of basic
Id.
GATT Secretariat, Trade Negotiations Committee, Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Communication from the Permanent Delegation of Mexico,
GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/38 (Nov. 26, 1990).
23 Id.
24
My research in this regard consists of exhaustive reading of relevant
negotiation records publicly available and interviews with staff of the WTO
Secretariat who were involved in, or otherwise familiar with, the Uruguay Round
negotiations of the SCM Agreement.
25
THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 19, at 503.
21
22
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economic theories and can shed light on the question of how
government monopoly should be dealt with under SCM Article
14(d).
2.2. Benchmarking Jurisprudence under Article 14(d)
To date, the issue of benchmarking in the provision of goods by
government monopoly (or near monopoly) has arisen in several
major WTO disputes, all involving government-owned natural
resources.
SCM jurisprudence on the issue has evolved
considerably. Below is an overview of the key findings on the issue
in these cases.
2.2.1. US–Softwood Lumber (IV):26 Canadian Timber
The Softwood Lumber dispute between the United States and
Canada is one of the most complex and enduring trade disputes in
modern history. Over the past decades, the conflict has generated
multiple rounds of litigation at NAFTA and the WTO.27 After the
DSB adopted the Appellate Body’s decision in Softwood Lumber (IV),
the two governments reached a negotiated settlement in 2006, but
the settlement expired in October 2015.28 In April 2017, the United
States began imposing new countervailing duties (CVD) on

26
Appellate Body Report, United States–Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc.
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter AB Report, Softwood Lumber
IV].
27
For an overview of the multiple litigations, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many
Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007).
28
The settlement was reached in September 2006 for seven years and was
extended for two years until October 2015. See Softwood Lumber Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America, Can.-U.S., Sept. 12, 2006, http://www.international.gc.ca/controlscontroles/softwood-bois_oeuvre/other-autres/agreement-accord.aspx?lang=eng
[https://perma.cc/8TQ8-YZBV]; Agreement between The Government of Canada
and The Government of The United States of America Extending the Softwood
Lumber Agreement between The Government of Canada and The Government of
The United States of America, as Amended, Can.-U.S., Jan. 23, 2012, https://treatyaccord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105335&lang=eng
[https://perma.cc/BPM7ZG24].
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softwood lumber from Canada.29 In November 2017, Canada
initiated another WTO case against the US CVD on softwood
lumber,30 which is currently pending.
The central issue in this lengthy dispute is quite simple: whether
the Canadian government subsidized lumber producers through its
stumpage programs. The difference of opinion between the United
States and Canada is rooted in the difference in their respective
forest systems. In Canada, 94% of the forestland is owned and
managed by government (Crown land), and only 6% is privately
owned.31 The government charges “stumpage fees” for harvesting
timber on Crown land, which are assessed by an administrative
body. In setting the stumpage fees, the government may consider
lumber prices, revenue needs, and other policy goals such as job
creation and sustainable forest management.32 By contrast, in the
United States, most of the forestland is privately owned and the
stumpage prices are determined by the market through auctions.
From the US perspective, Canada has been subsidizing lumber
producers with below-market stumpage fees, and it is therefore
justified in levying CVD on softwood lumber from Canada.
Denying the existence of any subsidy in its stumpage system,
Canada has challenged the US CVDs at both NAFTA and WTO
forums. Thus far, none of the forums have found that the Canadian
stumpage programs provided a subsidy.
US–Softwood Lumber (IV) is the first WTO case that dealt with the
issue of benchmarking in a situation where the government
29 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Issues
Affirmative Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination on Softwood Lumber
from Canada (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/pressreleases/2017/04/us-department-commerce-issues-affirmative-preliminarycountervailing [https://perma.cc/4N3D-TPWU].
30 See Request for Consultations by Canada, United States–Countervailing
Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS533/1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
A WTO panel was composed on July 6, 2018. See Constitution of the Panel
Established at the Request of Canada, United States–Countervailing Measures on
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS533/3 (July 9, 2018).
31
Provincial and territorial governments own about 90% of the public
forestland, while the federal government about owns 4%. See Gov’t of Can., Forest
RESOURCES
CAN.,
Land
Ownership,
NAT’L
www.nrcan.gc.ca/forests/canada/ownership/17495 [https://perma.cc/7CZMELBK] (last modified Jan. 18, 2019).
32 See, e.g., R. Q. Grafton, R. W. Lynch & H. W. Nelson, British Columbia’s
Stumpage System: Economic and Trade Policy Implications, in 24 CANADIAN PUBLIC
POLICY—ANALYSES DE POLITIQUES S41–S50 (Supp. S2 1998) (describing how
stumpage prices were set in British Columbia) [hereinafter Grafton et al., BC’s
Stumpage System]; see also Dunoff, supra note 27, at 321.
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dominates the market. In imposing CVDs on Canadian softwood
lumber, the US Department of Commerce (“USDOC”) used adjusted
US stumpage prices as the benchmark to determine the “benefit”
conferred by Canadian stumpage programs. According to the
United States, although there were private stumpage prices in
Canada, all such prices were distorted due to the predominant
position of the Canadian government in the timber market; as a
result, there were no market-determined prices in Canada that could
be used as benchmarks for Canadian stumpage fees. In the WTO
dispute, Canada challenged the US benchmarking decision as
inconsistent with SCM Article 14(d). The Panel agreed with Canada,
finding that because the US acknowledged the existence of private
stumpage market in Canada, “the resort to US prices as the
benchmark for the determination of benefit on grounds that private
prices in Canada were distorted is inconsistent with Article 14(d).”33
On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding. The
interpretive focus was on the second sentence of Article 14(d), which
states that “[t]he adequacy of remuneration [for the government]
shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for
the good or service in question in the country of provision . . . .”34 In
interpreting this provision, the Appellate Body established several
legal positions. First, the Appellate Body construed the phrase “in
relation to” as to “imply a broader sense of ‘relation, connection,
reference;’” consequently, an investigating authority is permitted to
use as a benchmark “something other than private prices in the
market of the country of provision” so long as it can demonstrate
that “the benchmark chosen relates or refers to, or is connected with,
the conditions prevailing in the market of the country of
provision.”35 In short, by interpreting the phrase “in relation to”
broadly, the AB opened the door for the investigating authority to
reject domestic prices in the country of provision as a benchmark
under Article 14(d).36
33
Panel Report, United States–Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 7.64, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/R
(Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Softwood Lumber IV].
34
SCM, supra note 1, art. 14(d).
35
AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 89.
36
According to Horlick, the AB made a “grave error” by “permitting crossborder comparisons, which should be anathema in CVD cases” and the AB’s
interpretation effectively deleted the phrase “in the country” from Article 14(d),
which phrase had been insisted on by Mexico in the SCM negotiations. Gary N.
Horlick, An Annotated Explanation of Articles 1 and 2 of the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 8 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 297, 299 (2013).
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Second, the Appellate Body indicated three specific
circumstances in which an investigating authority may reject
domestic prices in the country of provision under Article 14(d): (i)
where the government is the only supplier of the particular goods in
the country; (ii) where the government administratively controls all
of the prices for those goods in the country; and (iii) where private
prices in the country are distorted because of the predominant role
of the government in the market as a provider of the same or similar
goods.37 According to the Appellate Body, the third situation is
where the government has such a predominant role in the market
that private suppliers will align their prices with government prices
for the same or similar goods; in other words, where the government
effectively acts as a “price-setter” and private suppliers are “price
takers.”38
Third, the Appellate Body suggested two possible alternative
benchmarks that may be used in determining the adequacy of
remuneration for government-provided goods. They are “proxies
that take into account prices for similar goods quoted on world
markets,” and “proxies constructed on the basis of production
costs.” The AB emphasized, however, that when using an
alternative benchmark, an investigating authority is under the
obligation to ensure that the benchmark “relates or refers to, or is
connected with, prevailing market conditions in the country of
provision, and must reflect price, quality, availability, marketability,
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, as required
by Article 14(d).”39
Finally, regarding the alternative benchmark used by the
USDOC in this particular case, the Appellate Body cautioned that “it
would be difficult, from a practical point of view, for investigating
authorities to replicate reliably market conditions prevailing in one
country on the basis of market conditions prevailing in another
country.”40 The AB ultimately concluded that it was unable to
complete the legal analysis of whether the USDOC determination of
benefit is consistent with Article 14(d), because there were
insufficient factual findings or undisputed facts in the record.41

37
38
39
40
41

AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶¶ 98, 103.
Id. ¶ 99.
Id. ¶ 106.
Id. ¶ 108.
Id. ¶ 122.
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Consequently, the case did not result in a finding that the Canadian
stumpage programs provided subsidies to lumber producers.
Despite the lack of resolution of the dispute at hand, Softwood
Lumber (IV) established new benchmarking jurisprudence under
Article 14(d). Where the government has a predominant role in the
provision of goods or services, an investigating authority is
permitted to reject market prices in the country of provision and to
use an alternative benchmark to make the benefit determination,
provided that the alternative benchmark is “connected with”
prevailing market conditions in the country of provision. What
constitutes such a connection, however, remains to be determined
on a case-specific basis.
2.2.2. US–AD/CVD (China):42 Chinese Land
In this dispute, China challenged the USDOC determinations in
four concurrent antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations as inconsistent with WTO law.43 In two of the CVD
investigations, the USDOC found that the Chinese government’s
provision of land-use rights to the producers was for less than
adequate remuneration, and hence constituted countervailable
subsidies. In its benefit determinations, the USDOC rejected all land
prices in China as being distorted by the government and instead
used land prices in Thailand as the benchmark.44
In China, all land is publicly owned, and no private ownership
of land is permitted. Such public ownership consists of state
ownership and collective ownership. All urban land and mineral
resources are state-owned, whereas most rural land is collectively
42
Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R
(adopted Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter AB Report, US–AD/CVD (China)].
43
The products involved in these AD/CVD investigations were: circular
welded carbon quality steel pipe, certain new pneumatic off-the-road tires, lightwalled rectangular pipe and tube, and laminated woven sacks. Panel Report,
United States–Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products
from China, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Panel Report,
US–AD/CVD (China)].
44 Id. ¶¶ 10.165–10.167; see also Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s
Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 67893, 67909 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 3, 2007)
(preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination); Certain New
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg.
71360, 71369 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 17, 2007) (preliminary affirmative
countervailing duty determination).
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owned by the farmers residing thereon.45 For state-owned land, the
government may “grant” land-use rights to private entities for a fee,
and the land-use rights so granted can be sold in the secondary
market. The state may also “allocate” land for use by state-owned
entities for a nominal fee, but the allocated use rights are not
transferrable until full fees for land-use rights are paid. Collectiveowned land does not have transferable use rights and can only be
used for the benefit of the members of the collectives. The
government, however, may convert collective-owned land into
state-owned land through requisition upon payment of
compensation to the collective owners. Transferable land-use rights
may be granted through auction, bidding, or by agreement with
buyers. Where the grant is made by agreement, the fee charged may
not be lower than the minimum price set by law.46 The government
grants land-use rights according to planned purposes for land use
(such as residential, commercial, and industrial) and may charge
different fees for different purposes of use.
According to China, the USDOC acted inconsistently with SCM
Article 14(d) by rejecting in-country prices and using Thai prices as
the benchmark for China’s land-use rights. China claimed that
private prices exist in the secondary market for land-use rights in
China, and that the term “prevailing market conditions,” as
interpreted by the Appellate Body in Softwood Lumber IV, does not
refer to a “pure market” or a “market undistorted by government
intervention.”47
Furthermore, China argued that the Thai
benchmark, 3000 km away, bore no relationship to prevailing
market conditions in China.48 China additionally submitted that,
because land is not traded across borders and because its value is
significantly determined by its location and by the applicable legal
regime, it is impossible to “replicate reliably” the prevailing market
conditions for land in one country by referring to land values in
another country, which has its own physical, social, political, and
economic environment.49
The United States countered that USDOC’s use of an out-ofcountry benchmark in this case is justified under Article 14(d) as
XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 8, 9 (1982) (China).
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate (1994, as amended), art. 13.
47
Panel Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 43, ¶ 10.69.
48 Id. ¶ 10.169.
49 See id. n.686 (citing the AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 108);
see also id. ¶ 10.183.
45
46
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interpreted by the Appellate Body in Softwood Lumber IV. According
to the United States, the Chinese government not only ultimately
owns all the land, but also exercises significant control over the
supply side of the land market; as a result, land prices in both
primary and secondary markets are distorted.
Given the
predominant role of the government in China’s land market, the US
claimed, it was necessary to use an out-of-country benchmark to
measure the benefits at issue.50 In defending the Thai benchmark,
the US argued that the USDOC took into consideration several
factors (comparable per capita GNI, population density, and types
of land transactions) to ensure that Thai prices reasonably reflect
prevailing market conditions in China. The US also submitted that
due to limited information available it may not always be possible
for investigating authorities to adjust all of the items listed in Article
14(d), but that should not preclude a Member from selecting a
comparison price. If the bar for selecting the out-of-country
benchmark is set so high that it requires the use of unavailable data,
investigating authorities will be required to use in-country prices
even where they contain the very subsidy that they are trying to
measure, which would not capture the benefit of the subsidy due to
the predominant role of the government.51
The Panel agreed with the United States. In the view of the
Panel, based on the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Softwood Lumber
IV, the USDOC’s finding that the government was the sole supplier
of the good in question might have been sufficient for a conclusion
that it could not use in-country prices for land as the benchmark.
Yet, the Panel noted, the USDOC did not merely rely on the
government ownership of land for its conclusion; instead, it also
conducted an extensive analysis of the land-use market in China
before concluding that land-use prices in China were not set in
accordance with market principles.52 Satisfied with the USDOC’s
analysis, the Panel held that China did not establish that the USDOC
had acted inconsistently with SCM Article 14(d) by rejecting incountry land-use prices as benchmarks for land-use rights in
China.53 As for the use of the Thai benchmark, the Panel held that
Article 14(d) does not exclude, a priori, the possibility of determining
Id. ¶ 10.71.
Id. ¶¶. 10.175–10.176.
52 Id. ¶ 10.77. Specifically, the USDOC found that land-use rights were still
transferred via “closed-door” negotiations and not via public auctions, tenders or
listings as required by law.
53 Id. ¶¶ 10.78–10.82.
50
51
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the existence and amount of benefit for subsidies in the form of
provision of land on the basis of land prices in another country.
Otherwise, according to the Panel, it would become impossible for
the investing authority to determine the existence and amount of
any benefit in situations such as were found to exist in China.54
Furthermore, the Panel doubted that any adjustments to the Thai
benchmark could be made to ensure a closer approximation of an
undistorted land market in China, which is a counterfactual
situation. In any event, the Panel found that China had not
identified any specific adjustment that the USDOC was required to
make.55 The Panel thus concluded that China had failed to establish
that the USDOC’s use of the Thai benchmarks was inconsistent with
Article 14(d).56 China did not appeal the Panel’s rulings on land-use
rights.57
2.2.3. US–Carbon Steel (India):58 Indian Iron Ore and Coal
In India, the government (states and federal) owns all mineral
resources on behalf of the Indian public.59 The government grants
mining leases to companies (public or private) for the exploration
and exploitation of the minerals in exchange for royalty payments.
For more than a decade, the United States imposed countervailing
duties on steel imports from India, alleging that the Indian steel
producers were subsidized by the government provision of iron ore
and coal.60 More specifically, the USDOC found countervailable
Id. ¶ 10.184.
Id. ¶ 10.189.
56 Id. ¶ 10.191.
57
It is unclear why China decided not to appeal the Panel’s rulings on landuse rights, considering that it successfully appealed all other major rulings of the
Panel in this case.
58
Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Measures on Certain
Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS436/AB/R
(adopted Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter AB Report, Carbon Steel (India)].
59 Id. ¶ 2.179; see also Panel Report, United States–Countervailing Measures on
Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India, ¶ 7.73, WTO Doc.
WT/DS436/R (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report, Carbon Steel (India)].
60
USDOC issued the first of the underlying determinations challenged in this
case in 2001. See A. Ramanujan, A. Sharma & S. Seetharaman, US–Carbon Steel
(India): A Major Leap in Trade Remedy Jurisprudence, in WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT
TWENTY: INSIDERS’ REFLECTIONS ON INDIA’S PARTICIPATION 235 (Abhijit Das & James
J. Nedumpara eds., 2016).
54
55
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subsidies in (a) the supply of high-grade iron ore by the National
Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC), which is 98% owned
by the government of India, and (b) the grant of “captive mining
rights” by the Indian government, which allowed the steel
producers the exclusive rights to mine iron ore or coal for their own
use in the production of steel. In calculating the amount of benefits
conferred, the USDOC rejected India’s domestic prices, and used the
prices charged by Australian and Brazilian producers to Indian
buyers, as the benchmarks. India brought this dispute in 2012,
challenging the US countervailing measures as inconsistent with the
SCM Agreement.
2.2.3.1. Iron Ore Supplied by NMDC
With respect to the supply of iron ore by NMDC, India
challenged the USDOC’s determination that NMDC is a “public
body” (i.e., a subsidy provider), and the USDOC’s selection of
benchmarks in the benefit determination. On the issue of public
body, the Appellate Body followed its prior ruling that a public body
is an entity that “possesses, exercises, or is vested with
governmental authority”61 and found that the USDOC’s public body
determination was inconsistent with SCM Article 1.1(a)(1), because
it failed to provide “a reasoned and adequate explanation” for the
basis of its determination.62
It was on the issue of benchmarking that the Appellate Body
significantly developed its jurisprudence under Article 14(d). Recall
that in Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate Body had held that, where
the government has a predominant position in the provision of
goods or services, an investigating authority is permitted to reject
in-country prices and use alternative benchmarks in the benefit
determination. In this case, the Appellate Body clarified that
“whether a price may be relied upon for benchmarking purposes
under Article 14(d) is not a function of its source but, rather, whether
it is a market-determined price reflective of prevailing market
conditions in the country of provision.”63
Accordingly, in
considering in-country prices, an investigating authority may not
stop at private prices, but must also assess prices of “government61
62
63

AB Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 42, ¶ 317.
AB Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.55.
Id. ¶ 4.154.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

596

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:3

related entities” other than the entity providing the financial
contribution at issue.64 If such government prices are marketdetermined, they will form part of the benchmarks. Moreover, the
fact that governments may set prices in pursuit of public policy
objectives, rather than profit maximization, does not mean that
government prices must be discarded in determining a benchmark
under Article 14(d).65 Having established these positions, the
Appellate Body found that the USDOC acted inconsistently with
Article 14(d) by excluding NMDC’s prices from the benefit
determination and by using Australian and Brazilian prices as the
benchmarks for the iron ore supplied by NMDC.66
2.2.3.2. Mining Rights for Iron Ore and Coal
With respect to the grant of the captive mining rights for iron ore
and coal by the Indian government, the initial question was whether
the grant of such rights constituted the provision of “goods” under
Article 1.1.
Considering the mining rights as “reasonably
proximate” to the minerals extracted and enjoyed by the steel
companies, the Appellate Body answered the question in the
affirmative.67
The issue then was whether the grant of mining rights conferred
benefits to the steel companies, that is, whether the remuneration to
the government was “less than adequate” under Article 14(d). Since
the government of India received only royalties for the grant of the
mining rights, the inquiry should logically focus on the adequacy of
the royalty payments as compared with some benchmarks.68 Yet,
instead of assessing the adequacy of the royalties, the USDOC
determined benefits by first constructing “a government price for
iron ore and coal,” which included not only royalties but also the
costs associated with the extraction of iron ore and coal incurred by
64 Id. ¶ 4.151 note 740 (stating that the term “government-related entities”
refers to “all government bodies (whether national or regional), public bodies, and
any other government-owned entities for which there has not been a ‘public body’
determination.”).
65 Id. ¶¶ 4.170, 4.287.
66 Id. ¶¶ 4.290, 4.316–4.317.
67 Id. ¶ 4.75.
68
India made this argument and suggested that the adequacy of the royalties
should be determined in comparison to royalty rates in other countries. See id. ¶
4.324.
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the steel companies, and then comparing the constructed
government prices with the benchmarks chosen (i.e., the Australian
and Brazilian prices charged to Indian buyers).69 Oddly, even
though the Appellate Body had rejected the USDOC’s determination
that NMDC is a public body, and even though there was no claim
that any other recipients of the mining rights involved in this case
were part of the government, the Appellate Body found that it was
“permissible” under Article 14(d) to attribute the entire production
costs of iron ore and coal plus profits to the Indian government.70 It
appears that the Appellate Body viewed this conclusion as a logical
extension of its initial finding that the mining rights were proximate
to the minerals extracted by the right holders. But these are two
distinct matters. The AB’s initial finding addresses the applicability
of the SCM Agreement to the grant of mining rights, which is an
entirely different issue from the calculation of remuneration to the
government for the granting of these rights.
Its problematic finding on the calculation of remuneration
notwithstanding, the Appellate Body ultimately disagreed with the
USDOC’s benefit determination with respect to the iron ore
supplied by NMDC. The Appellate Body concluded that the
USDOC’s benefit determination is inconsistent with Article 14(d)
because the USDOC failed to provide “a reasoned and adequate
explanation” of the basis for its use of Australian and Brazilian
prices as benchmarks for the iron ore.71 However, with respect to
the provision of coal by the government through the grant of mining
rights, the Appellate Body declined to find that the USDOC’s use of
Australian prices as the benchmark was inconsistent with Article
14(d), and the reason for this decision was not explained.72
2.2.4. US–Coated Paper (Indonesia):73 Indonesian Timber
This recent case bears a close resemblance to Softwood Lumber
(IV). As in Canada, most forestland (99.5%) in Indonesia is
Id. ¶ 4.323.
Id. ¶ 4.332.
71 Id. ¶¶ 4.316–4.317.
72 Id. ¶ 4.322.
73
Panel Report, United States–Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on
Certain Coated Paper from Indonesia, WTO Doc. WT/DS491/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2018)
[hereinafter Panel Report, Coated Paper (Indonesia)].
69
70
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government-owned.74 The government charges royalty fees for
licenses to harvest timber from government-owned land. The
royalty fees are set administratively. The United States imposed
countervailing duties on certain coated paper products from
Indonesia, claiming that the Indonesian government subsidized the
paper producers with cheap timber and logs.75 In calculating
“benefit” conferred by the supply of timber, the USDOC rejected incountry prices for timber as benchmarks, on the ground that there
were no market-determined stumpage fees in Indonesia. Instead,
the USDOC constructed the benchmark based on Malaysian log
export price data from the World Trade Atlas, exclusive of
shipments to Indonesia.76
In the WTO proceeding, Indonesia challenged the USDOC’s
rejection of in-country prices as the benchmark as inconsistent with
SCM Article 14(d). In particular, Indonesia submitted that the
royalty fees payable were for the right to use land, and not for the
supply of standing timber, because most of the timber at issue was
not pre-standing but was planted and harvested by the license
holders in plantations they had built on government-owned land.
As a result, Indonesia claimed, the government did not own the
standing timber and had no control over the prices charged by the
license holders in the timber market. That being the case, Indonesia
argued, the royalty fees payable to the government do not constitute
“remuneration” for the supply of timber.77 The United States
countered that the royalty fees were stumpage fees, because they
were tied to the volume of wood harvested from the land, rather
than the acreage leased.78 Indonesia’s claims were rejected by the
Panel. According to the Panel, the question of whether the
government provided a good in the form of standing timber pertains
to the finding of a financial contribution under SCM Article 1.1(a).
Since Indonesia did not challenge the USDOC’s finding under
74 See id. ¶¶ 7.40, 7.47 (the government’s market share in the market for
standing timber was over 93% and its ownership of harvestable land in Indonesia
was approximately 99.5%, with private forests accounting for just 6.27% of the total
harvest during the period of investigation).
75
The measure concerning logs was an export ban on logs imposed by the
Indonesian government, which is beyond the scope of discussion in this Article.
76
Panel Report, Coated Paper (Indonesia), supra note 73, ¶ 7.48. According to
the USDOC, it used log prices as the basis for stumpage benchmark because the
market value of timber is derivative of the value of the downstream products. Id.
n.108.
77 Id. ¶ 7.42, ¶ 7.42 n.99.
78 Id. ¶ 7.43.
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Article 1.1(a), the Panel must assume the USDOC’s finding on the
existence of financial contribution was proper.79 Citing the
predominant market share of the Indonesian government in the
timber market and the fact that royalty fees were administratively
determined, the Panel concluded that the USDOC did not err in
finding that there were no market-determined prices for timber in
Indonesia.80 In reaching this conclusion, the Panel essentially
followed the AB’s reasoning in Softwood Lumber (IV).
Notably, the Panel did not examine whether the out-of-country
benchmarks selected by the USDOC were proper under Article
14(d), since Indonesia’s claims were limited to the USDOC’s
rejection of in-country prices as the benchmark.81
2.2.5. The State of Benchmarking Jurisprudence under Article 14(d)
The benchmarking jurisprudence concerning government
monopoly has evolved considerably under Article 14(d). The
principal position established in Softwood Lumber IV—when the
government is the predominant supplier in the country, domestic
prices can be assumed as distorted—was modified by the Appellate
Body in Carbon Steel (India). In the latter case, the Appellate Body
explicitly cautioned against equating price distortion with
government predominance. Instead, the Appellate Body held that
government prices (including prices charged by all government
bodies, public bodies, and SOEs) may be market-determined; thus,
government prices other than the financial contribution at issue may
not be excluded from the determination of market benchmarks, even
if such prices were set in pursuit of public policy objectives rather
than profit-maximization. This shift in the Appellate Body position
appears to be nothing short of a fundamental change in its view of
government’s role in the market. It remains to be seen whether the
AB’s new position will take hold.82
Having held that government prices may be market-determined,
however, the Appellate Body did not specify how an investing
Id. ¶ 7.45.
Id. ¶ 7.61.
81 See id. ¶ 7.28.
82
Notably, the Panel in Coated Paper (Indonesia) followed the AB’s position in
Softwood Lumber IV rather than Carbon Steel (India). See supra notes 74–81 and
accompanying text. Indonesia did not appeal the Panel’s decision.
79
80
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authority should make the relevant assessment. Conceptually, to
assess whether a government price is “market-determined,” it is
necessary to first define the market. According to the Appellate
Body, the term “market” refers to “the area of economic activity in
which buyers and sellers come together and the forces of supply and
demand affect prices”; “prevailing market conditions” in Article
14(d) “consist of generally accepted characteristics of an area of
economic activity in which the forces of supply and demand interact
to determine market prices.”83 These definitions, while helpful, do
not address some of the key questions concerning government
monopoly. For example, when the government is the sole provider
of a good in the country, is there a domestic “market” for the good?
That is, do we recognize the existence of “market” between a single
supplier and multiple buyers? What if two or more local
governments compete in supplying the good or service in the
country? Should we recognize such competition or should we treat
all local governments as one provider for the purpose of Article
14(d)?84 Does the existence of government monopoly or intergovernmental competition constitute “prevailing market
conditions” for the good or service in question in the country of
provision? Furthermore, if the government monopoly exports,
thereby directly competing in the world market for the supply of the
good or service in question, is the government export price then
“market-determined”? The Appellate Body in Carbon Steel (India)
seemed to think so.85 But if such an export price is marketdetermined, does it also “relate to” the prevailing market conditions

83
AB Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.150 (citing Appellate Body
Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 404, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/AB/R/ (adopted Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter AB Report, US–Upland
Cotton]).
84
While the Appellate Body has clarified that investigating authorities “may
be called upon to examine the conditions of competition” in determining whether
government-related prices are market determined, it appears to have limited such
examination to the competition between business entities, including both stateowned and private entities, but not competition between local governments. See
Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain
Products from China, ¶ 4.62, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015)
[hereinafter AB Report, US–CVD (China)].
85
In ruling against the USDOC for its rejection of NMDC’s export prices of
iron ore as possible market benchmarks, the Appellate Body apparently considered
it possible that NMDC’s export prices (which the Appellate Body had attributed to
that of the government of India) were “market determined.” AB Report, Carbon
Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.290.
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in the country of provision as required by Article 14(d)? These basic
questions remain to be answered.
Meanwhile, it has been well settled that the government price
for the financial contribution at issue cannot be used as the
benchmark, as it would be “inherently circular” if the very
government price that investigating authorities are seeking to test
were used as the benchmark itself.86 For this situation, the Appellate
Body has suggested certain alternative benchmarks under Article
14(d), including proxies based on prices in world markets,
constructed prices based on production costs, the export price of the
government monopoly for like product, and the import price of
foreign like product. In addition, the Panel in US–AD/CVD (China)
has accepted the use of unadjusted foreign market prices as the
benchmark for government provision of land in China.
The AB has emphasized that any alternative benchmark under
Article 14(d) must reflect prevailing market conditions in the
country of government provision. But it has not clarified how the
alternatives it suggested or accepted actually met that standard in a
given situation.87 As for pure foreign market prices as the
alternative, the AB has not had a chance to examine such use directly
under Article 14(d).88 Nonetheless, the AB has explicitly cautioned
against such use, stating that as a practical matter it would be very
difficult for the investigating authority to “replicate reliably” market
conditions prevailing in one country on the basis of market
conditions prevailing in another country.89

Id., ¶ 4.166.
There is also an unexplained inconsistency in the AB rulings on the use of
import prices of foreign like product. See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
88
Recall that in Softwood Lumber IV, the AB was unable to address this issue
due to the lack of sufficient information on the record. In US–AD/CVD (China),
China did not appeal the relevant Panel ruling. And in Coated Paper (Indonesia),
Indonesia did not request the Panel to examine whether the foreign prices used by
the US as benchmarks were WTO-consistent, nor did it launch an appeal to the
Panel report.
89
AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 108.
86
87
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3. SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS
3.1. Evaluation of Existing Alternative Benchmarks under Article
14(d)
In accordance with Article 14(d), the benchmark used to assess
the adequacy of remuneration for the government provision of good
or service must be “in relation to” prevailing market conditions for
the good or service in question “in the country of provision”, and
such prevailing market conditions include price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of
purchase or sale. As previously discussed, the Appellate Body has
interpreted the phrase “in relation to” broadly so as to open the door
for the use of out-of-country benchmarks when the government
holds a predominant position in the domestic market.90 Yet, the
door is not so widely open as to allow any tenuous or fictitious
connection to pass muster, since the AB also cautioned that it would
be very difficult for the investigating authority to “replicate reliably”
market conditions prevailing in one country on the basis of market
conditions prevailing in another country.91 Arguably, “reliable
replication” is the standard the AB had in mind when it interpreted
“in relation to” to allow the possibility of using out-of-country
benchmarks under Article 14(d). “Reliable replication” of domestic
market conditions, of course, is a very high standard for any out-ofcountry benchmarks.
To date, five alternative benchmarks have been suggested or
accepted by WTO adjudicators under Article 14(d). Of these, the
Appellate Body has suggested the following four: (i) proxies
constructed on the basis of production costs; (ii) proxies that take
into account world market prices for similar products; (iii) export
prices of the government monopoly in a different transaction (not
involving the financial contribution at issue); and (iv) import prices
of foreign like product. The Panel in US–AD/CVD (China) has
accepted the fifth (v): market prices of like product in a third
country. Of these five alternatives, two are purely out-of-country
prices (i.e., proxies based on world market prices and prices in a

90
91

See supra text accompanying notes 35–36.
AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 108.
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third country) and the other three each have a certain degree of
connection with domestic market conditions.
In theory, the choice among all possible benchmarks in a given
case should be the one that can most accurately reflect (i.e., replicate)
market conditions prevailing in the country of provision. Although
in practice the benchmark selection in each case is necessarily factspecific, it is nonetheless possible to evaluate the five alternatives
according to the degree of their apparent connectivity with the incountry market conditions:
• Export prices of the government monopoly for like
product in transactions other than the financial
contribution at issue. This alternative seems to have the
support of the AB in Carbon Steel (India) with respect to
the iron ore exported by NMDC. There are, however,
some conceptual difficulties associated with this choice.
Technically, the standard for the benchmark under
Article 14(d) is that it reflects (or replicates) the market
conditions in the country of provision. The pricing of
exports, in contrast, reflects the supply and demand
conditions in the world market.92 While the export price of
the government provider should also reflect the
conditions of domestic production, without examining
the conditions of domestic production, one cannot know
whether such export price (in the transactions other than
the financial contribution at issue) is itself “subsidized”
by the government provider. Logically, if the export
price of a government monopoly is accepted as the
benchmark reflecting domestic market conditions, the incountry prices of the government monopoly must also be
It is unclear
recognized as market-determined.93
whether the AB has embraced this position.
• Proxies constructed based on production costs. This
alternative was suggested by the AB in Softwood Lumber
92 See Appellate Body Reports, Canada–Renewable Energy/Canada–Feed-in Tariff
Program, ¶ 5.169, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R; WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted 24
May 2013) [hereinafter AB Reports, Canada–Renewable Energy] (stating “the
definition of the relevant market is central to, and a prerequisite for, a benefit
analysis under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.”).
93 See,
e.g., The Four Types of Market Structures, QUICKONOMICS,
https://quickonomics.com/market-structures/ [https://perma.cc/LTG8-533Y]
(explaining that in a standard economy analysis, monopoly is one of the four basic
types of market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic competition,
oligopoly, and monopoly).
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IV. Production costs of a good are expenses incurred in
manufacturing the good, including the costs of labor,
raw materials, manufacturing overhead and a normal
profit margin. The costs are typically incurred in the
country of production and can be ascertained from the
actual production data. A cost-based benchmark,
therefore, is capable of reflecting the prevailing market
conditions in the country of provision. One potential
problem with this method arises when the government
also dominates the supply of one or more inputs for the
good in question, in which case the use of another
alternative may be required. For whatever reason, this
suggestion of the AB has not been adopted in practice.
The import price of foreign like product. This was
accepted by the AB in Carbon Steel (India) as the
benchmark for coal provided by the Indian government.
Assuming the import transaction is at arm’s length, the
actual price paid by the domestic firm for the imports
must relate to the market conditions in the importing
country, such as price, quality, and availability of the
good in question. However, if all else is equal, it would
be difficult to understand why the domestic firm would
be willing to pay more for imports than the cheaper price
charged by the government provider. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether one or two import transactions can
be considered to reflect the “prevailing” market
conditions in the importing country for the good in
question, since the domestic market is still dominated by
the government provider.94 Unfortunately, the AB in
Carbon Steel (India) did not provide any explanation for
its acceptance of this alternative.
Proxies based on world market prices for like products.
This alternative was suggested by the AB in Softwood
Lumber IV but has not been adopted in practice. There
are, however, some conceptual difficulties associated
with this alternative. For one thing, if the good in
question is sold at the world market price, there will be
no way of knowing whether the pricing of the good has

94
If the imports were numerous and substantial, then the government
provider would have to compete with the imports in its domestic market. In that
case, the government would no longer have a monopoly and there should be a
market price for the good in question in the country of provision.
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benefitted from the very government subsidy under
investigation. For another, if the good is sold at a price
lower than world market prices, using the world market
price as the benchmark will deny any comparative
advantage the country of provision might have in the
good in question.95
• The price of like product in a foreign country. This was
the US approach with respect to Canadian timber,
Indonesia timber, and Chinese land. This approach was
accepted by the Panel with respect to Chinese land but
has not been examined by the AB in any specific case.96
As a result, the US approach has prevailed in practice.
Compared to world market prices, prices in a foreign
country market are even less likely to be connected with
to market conditions in the country of provision. Using
such foreign prices as the benchmark without
adjustment deprives the country of provision of any
comparative advantage it may have in the good in
question.
In sum, of the above five alternatives, “proxies constructed on
the basis of production costs” appears to be the one that is most
capable of reflecting in-country market conditions.97 While this
approach has not been adopted in practice under the SCM
Agreement, the cost of production has been considered appropriate
95 But see AB Report, US–AD/CVD (China) supra note 42, ¶¶ 500–501 (accepting
the proxy constructed on the basis of interest rates in 33 lower-middle-income
countries as the benchmark for commercial loans in China under Article 14(b)). The
text of Article 14(b), however, is different from Article 14(d): “[A] loan by a
government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is a
difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the
government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial
loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.” SCM, supra note 1, art.
14(b). Note that this text does not limit the benchmark for loans (“a comparable
commercial loan . . . .”) to what is available in the domestic market. Id.
96 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97
Conceptually, constructing benchmarks on the basis of cost of production
is to be distinguished from the notion of defining the existence of a benefit by the
cost to the government. It has been well established that the existence of a benefit
does not depend on the cost to the government, but on whether the recipient of a
government financial contribution is made better off as compared to the conditions
in the marketplace. See Appellate Body Report, Canada–Measures Affecting the
Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 154–156, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug.
4, 2000) [hereinafter AB Report, Canada–Aircraft] (finding defining the term
“benefit” in terms of cost to the government is at odds with the plain meaning of
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM).
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as the benchmark for conducting the benefit analysis in the context
of agricultural subsidies examined under the Agreement on
Agriculture, in cases where domestic prices are distorted by
government-administered prices.98
3.2. Constructing Domestic Benchmarks on the Basis of Production
Costs: The Question of Rent
Having concluded that a production-cost based proxy is the
most preferable among the five alternative benchmarks discussed
above, we now turn to the construction of such a proxy for the
provision of natural resources. Unlike other goods and services, the
prices of natural resources typically include “resource rent.”99 The
effect of resource rent on trade was discussed extensively in the USCanada softwood lumber dispute under the US-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, based on the testimony of Dr. William D. Nordhaus.100
The thesis, however, has not been examined in WTO dispute
proceedings. This section will focus on the question of how resource
rent should be treated in the construction of benchmarks based on
production costs.
3.2.1. Production Costs and Resource Rent
Production costs of natural resources are costs incurred in the
entire process of making the resources available to the market. For
98 See DOMINIC COPPENS, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING
MEASURES: BALANCING POLICY SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 288–89 (2014) (citing
AB Reports in Canada–Dairy and in EC–Export Subsidies on Sugar).
99 See WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES 77 (2010),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr10-2c_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RPY-Y3FX] (distinguishing between different types of rents
and defining resource rent); see also Total Natural Resource Rents, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS
[https://perma.cc/4A7F-74XG] (showing that the World Bank calculates total
natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP in all countries and economies for
the year of 1970 and 2016, respectively).
100 See FTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Decision of the Panel
on Remand, FTA Doc. USA-CDA-1992-1904-01 (Dec. 17, 1993) [hereinafter Decision
of the Panel on Remand] (discussing extensively Dr. Nordhaus’ testimony and his coauthored empirical study on the effect of stumpage on timber harvest in British
Columbia).
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minerals, for example, production costs should include all expenses
incurred for the exploration and extraction of the minerals, such as
labor, materials, equipment, general overhead, and fees paid to the
owner of the resources, plus a normal profit.
When the government is the owner of a natural resource, it
typically grants the right to extract the resource—in the form of
license or lease—to a party, which may be a private firm or a
government-owned entity. In return for granting the right, the
government may charge fees, known as royalties (for minerals),
stumpages (for timber in North America), or simply use fees (for
land in China).
The fees collected by the government as the owner of land and
other natural resources represent a form of economic rent. In
economics, rent is payment for a factor of production (land, labor,
capital) in excess of the total costs (including a normal profit)
necessary to bring that factor into production. Economic rent is the
surplus value or return in excess of normal profit.101 For natural
resources, rent is measured as the difference between the price at
which a resource can be sold and the costs associated with its
production, including a normal return.102 More specifically,
resource rent consists of differential or Ricardian rent and scarcity
rent.103 Differential or Ricardian rent arises due to the differences in
the productivity of land (to be further discussed below); scarcity rent
arises when demand exceeds supply due to natural and legal
limitations on the supply of the resources.104
Conceptually, resource rent is the payment to the owner by
virtue of ownership alone, not including returns on any investment
the owner has made to improve the land or to make the resources
available for production. In short, rent contains no productive
value. Fees collected by the government owner are not necessarily
all rent. Depending on the specific situation, the fees may also cover
the costs of government investment in the resource project, or they
101 See WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 99
(defining different types of rents, including economic rent).
102
K.J. McKenzie & J.M. Mintz, The Tricky Art of Measuring Fossil Fuel Subsidies:
A Critique of Existing Studies, 4 U. OF CALGARY SPP RES. PAPERS, no. 14, Sept. 2011, at
14 (defining rent).
103 See WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 99
(identifying three types of rent: differential or Ricardian rent, scarcity rent, and
quasi-rent, and noting that differential rent and scarcity rent relate to the innate
characteristics of natural resources, whereas quasi-rent applies to entrepreneurial
skills).
104 Id.
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may cover investment costs only. In the latter case, the government
forgoes the rent it could otherwise charge.
Under SCM Article 14(d), all fees paid to the government for the
right to access natural resources have been treated as remuneration
to the government for the provision of resource products.105 The
remaining issue is to determine whether such remuneration is
adequate. While it may not be difficult to calculate the costs of
government investment, it is unclear how the adequacy of resource
rent should be measured.
3.2.2. Resource Rent and Its Effect on Trade
According to the classical Ricardian theory, rent arises from the
difference in the productive capacity of land: The least productive
land in cultivation for a produce (e.g., corn) does not carry rent. The
price of corn is set by the labor and capital necessary to produce corn
in the worst land. All other parcels of land carry rent, as they require
less labor and capital to produce the same quantity of corn, with the
highest rent going to the best land in cultivation. Thus, it is the price
of corn that determines the rent available, not the other way around.
And the price of corn is determined by the demand for corn and the
supply of corn from the least productive land that carries no rent.
According to Ricardo, because the price of commodities is regulated
by the margin of production, rent does not enter the price of
commodities.106
Modern economic theories have modified Ricardian rent
theory.107 It is uncontroversial, however, that Ricardian theory
applies to land with a single use. Examples of such land include
105 See AB Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 4.74 (holding that the
government’s grant of mining rights is reasonably proximate to the use or
enjoyment of the minerals by the beneficiaries of those rights).
106 See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION 46 (Batoche Books, 2001) (1817).
107
For example, in the view of neoclassical economists, Ricardian theory is
based on the assumption that land has only one use and that there is a fixed supply
of land; however, in most circumstances land has alternative uses, and each piece
of land has an opportunity cost which equals the (extra) rent that can be obtained
in its most profitable alternative use. That being the case, the rent of land for corn
is not determined solely by the demand for corn, but also by the price of potatoes if
growing potatoes is the most profitable alternative use for the land. In that sense,
rent enters the price of product. See ALAN W. EVANS, ECONOMICS, REAL ESTATE, AND
THE SUPPLY OF LAND 12–14 (2004) (comparing Ricardian theory with neoclassical
rent theory).
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mineral-land and timberland. In addition, where the land use is
restricted by the government, such as residential or industrial use,
the Ricardian theory also applies.108 We note that the several WTO
disputes discussed herein all involve the situation of single-use land.
The relevant question here is the effect of resource rent on trade.
Under Ricardian theory, the price of the product is determined by
the demand for the product and the supply of the least productive
land that carries no rent. When the product is traded across the
border, the demand for the product becomes the total global
demand, and the least productive land for the supply of that product
is also to be determined on a global basis. Thus, rent does not enter
the price of the product. It should be noted, however, that from the
perspective of the producer, rent to be paid to the owner is part of
her production cost, and hence enters the price of her products.
However, the producer’s perspective does not address the question
of how rent arises and what determines the available rent of a given
piece of land.109
Logically, if rent does not enter price, it cannot affect trade. But
what happens when the owner does not collect all the resource rent
available? In that event, the uncollected rent will go to the producer.
Would the producer increase production or lower prices as a result
of this rent sharing? In the case of resource products, because the
supply is limited by nature (and by conservation laws), the producer
is unable to produce more than what is available.110 With a fixed
supply, the producer cannot expect to sell more by lowering prices.
Hence, the producer will have no incentive to sell below the market
price, which is determined by the global demand and the supply of
the least productive land globally. While the uncollected rent by the
owner will benefit the producer financially, it will not change the
price and quantity of the resource product sold to the market by the

108 Id. at 11, 17–19 (discussing the relevance of Ricardian rent theory to the
planning controls over land in modern Britain, concluding that the price of land is
determined by demand when the supply of land for each use is fixed within the
planning system).
109 See generally Frank T. Carlton, Price and Rent, 26 Q.J. ECON. 523–527 (1912)
(discussing how differential rents arise).
110
The producer may be able to increase production by improving
technological capacity, in which case the producer will earn quasi-rent, which is
separate from the resource rent owed to the owner.
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producer.111 In other words, the uncollected rent by the owner has
no market-distorting effect on trade in the resource product.112
If resource rent does not distort trade, then there should be no
issue of adequacy of such rent under Article 14(d). Consequently, the
rent charged by the government for providing natural resources—
to the extent they represent rent in single-use land—should be
excluded from the benefit determination under Article 14(d).
As noted above, depending on the specific situation, the fees
charged by the government may consist of rent as well as a return
on government investment in the resources (such as the
expenditures on making the resources available).113 Since rent in
single-use land is irrelevant to the benefit determination, the only
issue is to determine whether the fees collected by the government
cover its expenditures in full. If the fees are less than the
government expenditure (also known as the case of negative rent114),
there is presumably a benefit conferred.
3.2.3. Tax Equivalent of Resource Rent: The Case of Government
Monopoly
When the government is by law the owner of all natural
resources, its right to collect resource rent, whether as royalties or
land-use fees, is no different from its power to collect taxes.115 Like
111 See John E. Orchard, The Rent of Mineral Lands, 36 Q.J. ECON. 290–318 (1922)
(explaining that mineral rent will go to either the owner of the land or the operator
of the mine and that neither consumer nor laborer will share the rent); see also
Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32 (demonstrating that BC’s stumpage was
not responsive to changes in the amount of available rent).
112
This was essentially the same conclusion reached by the binational review
panel in the US-Canada softwood lumber dispute. See Decision of the Panel on
Remand, supra note 100.
113
It is suggested that in the case of minerals, part of the royalty paid to the
owner is compensation for the depletion of minerals, which should be considered
as assets and not economic rent because mineral-land, unlike agricultural land,
cannot be replenished. See Orchard, supra note 111, at 294–96 (distinguishing rent
of mineral land from agricultural land). Under this theory, the fees charged by the
government should also cover the costs associated with resource depletion,
including compensation for environmental damage caused by the production of
resources.
114
For instance, where the government pays for a road to a mine in a remote
area, which is otherwise uneconomical to explore.
115 See McKenzie & Mintz, supra note 102, at 13–14 (arguing that royalties are
a fiscal instrument used to collect revenue from the oil and gas sector).
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taxes, rent does not represent the value of any productive effort;
instead, it is merely a fiscal instrument of the government to collect
revenue based on its sovereign authority. Seen in this light, it would
be a misnomer to call the resource rent collected by government as
remuneration under Article 14(d), since the concept of remuneration
implies compensation in exchange for work or services
performed.116 Rather, for purposes of the SCM Agreement, it is
conceptually more appropriate to treat government collection of
resource rent as analogous to government collection of taxes.117
Government revenue “that is otherwise due is foregone or not
collected” is one of the three types of financial contribution by
government defined in SCM Article 1.1.118 Unlike the other two
types of financial contribution—government transfer of funds and
government provision of goods or services—there exists no market
benchmark for determining whether a benefit is conferred by
foregone government revenue. As the Appellate Body noted, “[a]
Member, in principle, has the sovereign authority to tax any
particular categories of revenue as it wishes. It is also free not to tax
any particular categories of revenues.”119 The difficult task,
therefore, is to identify a defined, normative benchmark for
determining what is otherwise due in a given situation. The case law
has so far established two general principles. First, the normative
benchmark for determining government revenue otherwise due
must be the rules established by each Member for itself.120 Second,
the normative benchmark must allow a comparison of the fiscal
116 See
Remuneration,
OXFORD
LIVING
DICTIONARIES,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/remuneration
[https://perma.cc/P3UQ-T5NY] (defining remuneration as “Money paid for work
or a service”).
117
However, to the extent that the fees charged by the government exceed the
rent available and represent, instead, returns for government investment or services
performed relating to the resources, it will be appropriate to treat such fees as
“remuneration” falling under Article 14(d). It should also be noted that the
Appellate Body has recognized the possibility that the same transaction may be
characterized as different types of financial contribution under SCM Article 1.1. See
AB Reports, Canada–Renewable Energy, supra note 92, ¶ 5.120.
118
SCM, supra note 1, art. 1.1.
119
Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations”, ¶ 90, WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (adopted Mar. 20, 2000)
[hereinafter AB Report, U.S.–FSC].
120 See id. (“What is ‘otherwise due’ . . . depends on the rules of taxation that
each Member, by its own choice, establishes for itself.”). For a critique on the
benchmark for tax subsidies, see Sykes, supra note 5, at 5 (“The benchmark for the
situation that would prevail ‘otherwise,’ however, is largely arbitrary and
dependent on the form rather than the substance of government tax policies.”).
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treatment of taxpayers in comparable circumstances. In other
words, “like will be compared with like.”121
The same principles should apply to the normative benchmark
for determining resource rent otherwise due. Like in the tax
situation, a Member has the sovereign authority to collect all the
resource rent available in the country and is also free not to collect
any of such rent. Whether to collect, and how much to collect,
depends on the rules a Member establishes for itself. In other words,
there can be no “external” benchmark for determining what is the
resource rent otherwise due. The rules established by the Member,
however, must allow a comparison of treatment of rent-payers in
like circumstances. Because fixed natural resources are typically
unique in their location and value, thus each carrying a different
amount of rent, the only meaningful comparison of treatment will
often be between rent-payers with respect to the same resource. Put
differently, to the extent each piece of land carries its own rent, the
normative benchmark for the rent otherwise due should be
whatever amount of the fees the government sets to collect from any
potential renters (users) of a particular piece of land.122 An example
of such a benchmark is the royalty or use fees offered by the
government to all bidders of a particular resource. Accordingly,
when the government does not discriminate between users with
respect to the fees payable for a resource, there would not be a case
of foregone rent.
Interestingly, this conclusion echoes the basic idea of Draft SCM
Article 14(e). As noted above, Draft Article 14(e) provides that
“[w]hen the government is the sole provider . . . of the good or
service in question, the provision . . . of such good or service shall
not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless the government
discriminates among . . . purchasers of the good or service.”123
Although its rationale remains unexplained, the wisdom of Article
14(e) can be confirmed, at least in the context of government
provision of natural resources, by the tax equivalent theory.

121
Appellate Body Report, United States–Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales
Corporations”–Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, ¶ 90,
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002).
122
Strictly speaking, the amount of rent set by the government must be within
the range of available rent from a particular resource. If the amount charged by the
government exceeds the available rent (after covering the cost of government
investment), the excess is technically not resource rent, but pure taxes.
123 1990 Draft SCM Text, supra note 17, at 23.
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The tax-equivalent theory of resource rent is not only
conceptually sound, but also is easy to implement. Unlike Ricardian
or neoclassical rent theories, the application of which would require
calculation of rent for each piece of land, under the tax-equivalent
theory whether a benefit is conferred by the government provision
of natural resources can be simply determined by applying the same
principles of nondiscrimination as in the case of government
taxation under SCM Article 1.1.
It should be cautioned here that the tax-equivalent theory
applies only to the situation where the government is the sole or
predominant provider of a natural resource in the country. Where
the government is one of many providers of a resource in the
country, it is merely a participant in the resource market, without
the rent-charging power analogous to the power of taxation. In such
a situation, the amount of rent available to the government is
determined by the market. If the government foregoes that rent, it
will have conferred a benefit within the meaning of Article 14(d).124
3.2.4. A Normative Perspective: Comparative Advantage Based on
Systemic Differences
In principle, the WTO does not interfere with the property
ownership regime of its Members, as each country is entitled to
choose its own political, social and economic systems under
international law.125 Accordingly, where a Member adopts a system
of public ownership of natural resources, that choice should be
accepted as a given under WTO law. In the system of public
ownership of natural resources, the government is entrusted to
manage the exploration, distribution, and conservation of the
nation’s natural resources. Compared to countries with primarily
124
For example, the Appellate Body found that the government lease of an
industrial site near Hamburg conferred a benefit on Airbus within the meaning of
SCM Art. 1.1(b), based on the value of generally available industrial land in
Hamburg, plus a certain premium for the location and customized features that was
not included in the rent paid by Airbus. See Appellate Body Report, European
Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, ¶¶ 989–990, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/AB/R (adopted June 1, 2011)
[hereinafter AB Report, EC-Large Civil Aircraft].
125 See generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970),
http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm [https://perma.cc/HQ5R-UUBB].
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private ownership of natural resources, the government in the
public ownership system plays a much more extensive role in the
resource sector. The normative question is whether such a role
should be recognized as legitimate under the SCM Agreement.
In this regard, it is particularly instructive to quote Adam Smith,
who famously described rent-seeking landlords in these words:
As soon as the land of any country has all become private
property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap
where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its
natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the
field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land
was in common, cost the laborer only the trouble of
gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional
price fixed upon them. He must then pay for the license to
gather them; and must give up to the landlord a portion of
what his labor either collects or produces. This portion, or,
what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion,
constitutes the rent of land . . . .126
Thus, in accordance with Adam Smith, it would be morally
salutary that the government not seek rent from natural resources.127
Instead, in a country where natural resources are publicly owned,
the government should only manage the use of natural resources for
the public interest.
From a normative perspective, when the government “foregoes”
rent in a country of public ownership of natural resources, any price
advantage the producer may gain from such “foregone” rent should
be deemed a system-wide comparative advantage, rather than
categorically trade-distorting.
In a sense, the government
management of a nation’s natural resources can be likened to
government provision of public services. Wherever the government
provides extensive public services, such as transportation,
education and healthcare, businesses can benefit from the resulting
126
ADAM SMITH, Of the Component Parts of the Price of Commodities, in THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), http://geolib.com/smith.adam/woncont.html
[https://perma.cc/7CL9-ZBJU].
127
In this regard, the US government sets a remarkable example. Under the
General Mining Act of 1872, US citizens can explore and extract valuable minerals
on federal lands without paying royalties to the US government. For a defense of
the system, see Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak,
Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Under the General Mining Law of 1872, 34
ENVTL. L. 745 (2004) (arguing that the attacks on the General Mining Act of 1872
misunderstand the statute’s incentives).
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lowered costs of production.128 As a result, the country with better
public facilities and infrastructure enjoys a system-based
comparative advantage.129
It is important to note that government provision of “general
infrastructure” is excluded from the definition of “financial
contribution” under the SCM Agreement, and hence not subject to
SCM disciplines. The rationale for this exclusion appears to lie in
the general availability of infrastructure to all potential users,130
which comports with the SCM principle that only specific
government subsidies are objectionable.131 But, ultimately, the
exclusion of general infrastructure from SCM disciplines is a matter
of respecting the choices of individual Members in the system of
public works that lay down the economic foundation of a country.132
Public ownership and government management of a nation’s
natural resources is one such choice. Thus, so long as the
government does not discriminate between purchasers (i.e., making
the nation’s natural resources available to all potential users) its
provision of the resources should not be targeted by SCM
disciplines.133 Interestingly, this again is the underlying notion of
Draft Article 14(e).
128
On the other hand, businesses may be subject to high taxes that are used to
fund the government services.
129
In this sense, government policy or regulatory regime becomes another
“factor endowment”, albeit a man-made one. See Gilbert Gagné, Policy Diversity,
State Autonomy, and the US-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute: Philosophical and
Normative Aspects, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 699, 715 (2007).
130 See Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States-Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civilian Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/R, ¶ 7.1036 (June 30,
2010) (defining the term “general infrastructure” as “infrastructure that is not
provided to or for the advantage of only a single entity or limited group of entities,
but rather is available to all or nearly all entities.”).
131 See SCM, supra note 1, art. 2.
The assumption behind the notion of
specificity is that any effect of generally available subsidies on international
competitiveness will be counteracted by an offsetting movement in exchange rates.
But it is unclear that generally available subsidies will not distort trade from an
economic standpoint. See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures 4–5 (U. Chi. Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No.
186, 2003); see also LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND
EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 360–64 (Oxford University Press, 2009)
(discussing divergent economic views on the issue).
132 See RUBINI, supra note 131, at 364–66 (suggesting that the true rationale for
the specificity requirement is one of political economy).
133
Unfortunately, WTO jurisprudence has developed in the opposite
direction. A natural resource, due to its inherent characteristics, is used typically
by a limited group of enterprises or industries. Ignoring such inherent
characteristics, WTO adjudicators have agreed with the United States that Canada’s
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3.2.5. Application of the Theories
It is instructive to see how the application of the above theories
might affect the benchmarking analysis in the four WTO cases
discussed above.
3.2.5.1. Canadian Timber
The central interpretive issue in this ongoing dispute is whether
the stumpage fees charged by the Canadian governments for the
right to harvest timber are “less than adequate remuneration”
within the meaning of Article 14(d). Recall that most of the
timberland in Canada is owned by provincial, territorial or federal
government, and that the government sets stumpage rates
administratively, taking into account lumber prices, revenue needs
and other policy goals, including job creation and sustainable forest
management.134 While the stumpage fees represent the resource
rent of timberland, the fees actually collected by the government do
not exactly match the amount of rent available. For example,
according to a study on British Columbia’s stumpage system, during
a 25-year period (1970–1994), the government of British Columbia
collected more than the available rent in seven years, and less than
the available rent in 18 years.135 The study shows that by
overcharging or undercharging, as compared to rent available, the
stumpage system had a varying impact on the industry and on
government policy goals.136 For SCM purposes, only the situation
of undercharging may raise concern: Does the collection of less than
available rent constitute inadequate “remuneration” of the
government under Article 14(d)?
Under Ricardian theory, rent does not affect the supply or price
of timber, because the supply is limited by the number of trees
provision of timber and India’s provision of iron ore were de facto specific, even
though there was no evidence of government discrimination between users. See
Panel Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 33, at ¶ 7.125; AB Report, Carbon Steel
(India), supra note 58, at ¶ 4.398.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 31–32.
135 See Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32, at S47 tbl.2.
136 See id. at S48 (suggesting that rent overcharging may cause less than a
desirable number of trees being cut, job losses in the industry and other
consequences, whereas undercharging may lead to excess investments that
ultimately reduce employment).
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available to be cut (which is also subject to conservation regulations)
and given the fixed supply the price is determined by the demand.
The rent uncollected by the government will go to the producer of
timber, but will not lower the timber price, as the producer cannot
sell more timber by lowering the price. This is the very argument
successfully made by Canada in the softwood lumber dispute under
the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.137 The British Columbia
study mentioned above suggests that the uncollected rent might
have been used in several ways, including increased returns to the
shareholders of lumber companies, higher wages to forestry
workers, and increased capital investments and capacity in the
industry beyond what is necessary to process the available timber.138
Under the tax-equivalent theory, the stumpage fees charged by
the Canadian government are in essence a special resource tax levied
on timber harvesting. As in taxation, the government collects the
stumpage revenue by virtue of its sovereign power, not by a claim
to the remuneration for its services. Also, as in taxation, the
government sets the rate of stumpage administratively, taking into
account its public policy objectives. Thus, like the treatment of taxes
under the SCM Agreement, whether the government has provided
a financial contribution by foregoing its stumpage revenue
“otherwise due” will depend on the comparison of the stumpage
revenue received with the generally applicable stumpage rate set by
the government for itself. So long as each government applies a
single rate to all timber producers in its territory, as is apparently
the case here, there is no revenue foregone, hence no subsidy can be
found to exist under the SCM Agreement.
From the normative perspective, public ownership and
government management of timber resources in Canada is part and
parcel of its socio-economic system. If Canadian stumpage rates are
generally lower than those prevailing in the United States, which has
a very different ownership and market structure for timber
resources, then Canada apparently has a system-based comparative
advantage in timber trade.139 This advantage is not fundamentally
different from other system-based comparative advantages enjoyed
by Canadian producers, such as its publicly funded national
healthcare.140
See Decision of the Panel on Remand, supra note 100.
Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32, at S46.
139 See generally Gagné, supra note 129.
140
For example, according to the Canadian government, Canada’s auto parts
operations enjoy a 31.1% saving on total labor costs relative to their US
137
138
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In sum, when applied to Canadian stumpage, each of the three
theories analyzed in this section leads to the same conclusion: the
Canadian stumpage system does not give rise to a financial
contribution that confers a benefit within the meaning of the SCM
Agreement.
3.2.5.2. Indonesian Timber
The same analysis for the application of the three theories can be
made in the case of Indonesian timber. Compared to Canada’s
stumpage fees, the rent nature of Indonesia’s royalty fees is even
more pronounced, as the fees were charged to the license holders for
growing timber on the government land.141 It is immaterial whether
the rent was calculated based on the quantity of timber harvested or
the acreage of forestland leased.
3.2.5.3. Indian Minerals
As owner of all mineral resources in the country, the
Government of India grants the right to mine iron ore and coal to
state-owned as well as private entities in exchange for royalty
payments. For SCM purposes, the central interpretive issue should
be whether the royalty payments received by the Indian government
are less than adequate remuneration within the meaning of Article
14(d).
In theory, the royalties collected by the government represent
the resource rent of mines, but in practice they typically do not
match the amount of available rent in each mine.142 If the royalty
collected by the government is less than the available rent from a
given mine, then the remaining rent will go to the mining company.
counterparts, and lower costs of employee healthcare form the greatest part of these
savings. See Gov’t of Can., Canada’s Cost and Tax Advantages–Automotive (2017),
www.international.gc.ca/investorsinvestisseurs/assets/pdfs/download/factsheet-automotive-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DAC7-RAD8].
141 See Panel Report, Coated Paper (Indonesia), supra note 73, at ¶ 7.42, n.99.
142
The typical mismatch between available rent and royalty charged is due to
the fact that “[r]oyalty rates are set by government fiat—there is no marketdetermined royalty rate that is the analog of a market price.” McKenzie & Mintz,
supra note 102, at 13.
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While enriched by the rent, the mining company cannot increase the
supply of minerals at will,143 nor will it have the incentive to charge
below-market prices given the fixed supply. Consequently, the rent
shared by the mining company should not have market-distorting
effect on trade in minerals. The issue of less than adequate
remuneration would otherwise arise in the situation of negative rent
(i.e., if the royalty collected is less than the government expenditure
on the mine) whether in the form of investment or service. That
situation, however, was not alleged in this case.
In essence, the royalty charged by the Indian government is a
special resource tax. Thus, as long as the government applies the
same royalty rate to all potential miners, there should be no revenue
foregone within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. As the record
shows, the government of India does not discriminate between
potential miners with respect to the allocation of mining rights or
payment of royalty.144
3.2.5.4. Chinese Land
Compared to timber and minerals, land has certain unique
features. First and foremost, land is not a tradable good. Unlike
timber and minerals, which are commodities traded globally, there
is no world market for land.145 Also, unlike timber and minerals,
land is a necessary input for all production activities. How these
unique characteristics of land may affect trade has not been much
discussed; rather, land has been treated in the same manner as all
other tradable goods in SCM jurisprudence.146
143
The total supply of minerals is fixed by nature. While it is theoretically
possible that the mining company may use the rent income to hire more labor or
equipment to increase the production capacity, whether that is indeed the practice
needs to be tested in each case.
144 See Panel Report, Carbon Steel (India), supra note 58, ¶ 7.201 (stating that
India granted mining rights for iron ore on a first-come-first-served basis).
145
Land, together with labor and money, are known as fictitious commodities,
which do not behave in the same way as true commodities because they are not
produced to be sold on a market. Unlike true commodities, the supply and demand
for the fictitious commodities must be managed through the political process, that
is, through the power of government.
See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 71–79
(Beacon Press, 2001) (1944).
146 See, e.g., Panel Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 42; AB Report, ECLarge Civil Aircraft, supra note 124.
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As previously discussed, in China, all transferable land is owned
by the state and the government grants land-use rights in exchange
for land-use fees. In practice, local governments control land use in
their own jurisdiction within the broad parameters of national laws.
Land use is divided into different categories according to planned
purposes, such as industrial, commercial and residential, and the
term of use varies depending on the category. The land-use fees
may be set through auction or by agreement subject to certain
minimum prices.
In contrast with the price of resource products such as timber
and minerals, the price of land is all rent (unless the owner has made
land improvements).147 Due to the strict land-planning system in
China, each piece of transferable land in the country is essentially
land for a single use. Thus, according to Ricardian rent theory, the
price of land-use right for a given piece of industrial land (to the
extent it is all rent) is determined by the demand for the products of
the land—say a gadget—and the supply of land that is the least
desirable for producing the same gadget.148 The desirability of the
land for producing the gadget depends on factors ranging from local
transportation and infrastructure, to labor quality and costs, to the
macro economic and political environment in the country.
However, because land is not the final product in trade, the effect
of land price on trade in gadgets might be somewhat different from
the case of resource products. Compared to the production of
timber or minerals, the supply of gadgets is likely to be limited more
by capital and labor than by land. That being the case, when the
government does not collect all the available rent from a given piece
of land, the uncollected rent may enable the producer to increase
production or lower prices. Whether this occurs has to be
determined in each specific case. But to the extent it occurs, the rent
of land foregone by the government may have an effect on trade.
From a normative perspective, however, the government in a
country of public ownership of land is not supposed to seek rent,
but to manage land use in the public interest. Thus, when the
147
The price of resource products covers not only rent to the owner of the
resource, but also the cost of labor and capital for producing the products.
148 See Carlton, supra note 109, at 525 (“[D]ifferential rent, which is a measure
of desirability, appears because of the existence of a demand for various products
or goods coupled with the presence of land of varying grades of desirability . . . .
With a given land supply, present or potential, and no change in industrial
methods, differential rents increase and decrease as the demand for products
varies.”).
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government foregoes rent in such a country, any price advantage the
producer may gain therefrom should be deemed as a system-wide
comparative advantage.
Moreover, the case of China’s land-use fees highlights the taxequivalent theory of rent. As is well known, land-use fees are the
functional equivalent of property tax in China, counting for onefourth to one-third of total revenues for the local governments.149
Thus, just as in the case of taxation, whether the land-rent foregone
constitutes government revenue that is otherwise due within the
meaning of SCM Article 1.1 depends on the generally applicable
level of land-use fees set by the local government itself. If the
government charges all users the same level of land-use fees for
comparable land, there is no foregone revenue within the meaning
of Article 1.1. Conversely, if the government charges a user landuse fees at a level lower than the generally applicable one, a case of
foregone revenue may be established.
3.2.5.5. Summary
This section applies economic rent theories to the provision of
natural resources by government monopolies, with the objective of
identifying the trade-distorting potential of such provision. The
resort to rent theories is warranted, given that the return (or
“remuneration”) for the government’s grant of right to use natural
resources typically consists of rent. In order to determine whether
the “remuneration” to the government is adequate under SCM
Article 14(d), it is necessary to understand how rent affects trade.
The key insights from the application of rent theories are:
(1) With respect to resource products, such as timber and
minerals, the amount of rent uncollected by the government does
not affect trade in the resource products. That is because the supply
of a resource product is relatively fixed (i.e., limited by nature and
conservation laws), and the price of the product is therefore set by
the demand. Any rent uncollected by the government will go to the
producer but will not increase the quantity or lower the price of the
resource product.
149 See Donald Clarke, Has China Restored Private Land Ownership?, FOREIGN
AFF. (May 16, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/Articles/china/2017-0516/has-china-restored-private-land-ownership
[https://perma.cc/26E6-SQ8H]
(discussing local government revenue breakdowns, portions of which come from
land-use fees).
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(2) With respect to land for industrial use, the rent uncollected
by the government may affect trade if it has enabled the producer to
increase production or lower prices. That is so because land is not a
good in trade, but a factor of production for all industries. In a
system of public ownership of land, however, whether the
government collects rent or how much rent it decides to collect from
state-owned land is a matter of public policy. Therefore, it is
normatively inappropriate to deem the rent foregone in such a
system as categorically trade-distorting. Whether the rent foregone
is trade-distorting in a specific case can be determined rationally by
applying the principle of nondiscrimination.
(3) Conceptually, rent is not “remuneration” because it is not
compensation for labor or return on capital. Government’s right to
collect rent is the same as government’s right to collect taxes.
Technically speaking, therefore, rent should be treated as
government revenue under SCM Article 1.1, rather than as
remuneration for government provision of goods or services under
Article 14(d). Whether the rent foregone is otherwise due can be
determined by the same criteria for foregone tax revenue.
The one exception is the case of negative rent, that is, the amount
of resource fees collected by the government is less than
governmental expenditures on making the resources available for
production. In such a case, a benefit can be identified within the
meaning of Article 14(d), because the fees are less than adequate
remuneration for the government investment.
3.3. Constructing Domestic Benchmarks on the Basis of Optimal Use
of Resources: A Different Alternative
In addition to the five alternatives that have been suggested or
accepted by the WTO adjudicators, it is also possible to construct
domestic benchmarks based on specific policy objectives. This
section explores such a possibility.
3.3.1. Constructing Domestic Benchmarks in Light of the SCM
Objectives
Domestic benchmarks may be constructed in different ways,
depending on one’s understanding of the objectives of WTO subsidy

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/2

2019]

Market Benchmarks and Government Monopoly

623

discipline. Unlike most WTO agreements, the SCM Agreement does
not have a preamble or provision setting forth its objectives, which
reflects the lack of agreement among Members on this score.150 The
Appellate Body has described the object and purpose of the SCM
Agreement as “[T]o strengthen and improve GATT disciplines
relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures,
while, recognizing at the same time, the right of Members to impose
such measures under certain conditions.”151 Yet this description
says little about the rationale of WTO subsidy disciplines.
There are generally two schools of thought concerning the
purpose of international regulation of government subsidies.152 One
is the injury-only school, which focuses on the adverse effects of
government subsidies on producers of other countries, thus seeing
the purpose of international regulation as mainly to remedy such
adverse effects. Indeed, the prohibited and actionable subsidies
under the SCM Agreement are all based on their adverse effects on
foreign producers.153 This conception of SCM disciplines is
producer-oriented, reflecting the traditional GATT approach to the
regulation of international trade.
In accordance with this
conception, government subsidies are not objectionable unless they
cause injurious effects to the producers of other Members. By
contrast, the anti-distortion school focuses on the market-distorting
potential of government subsidies broadly. From this perspective,
the main purpose of international regulation is to ensure proper
function of the market and to achieve economic efficiency on a
global basis. This conception of the SCM discipline finds support in
the overall objectives of the WTO, including “the optimal use of the
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development”, as stated in the preamble of the WTO Agreement.154
Viewed through this lens, government subsidies are suspect of
market-distorting measures unless proven otherwise.
150 See M. Cartland et al., Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute
Settlement?, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 992 (2012); see also RUBINI, supra note 131, at 56–
57.
151
AB Report, Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 26, ¶ 64.
152 See RUBINI, supra note 131, at 43 (describing the differences between the
injury-only school and the anti-distortion school).
153 See SCM, supra note 1, art. 4 (“prohibited subsidies,” which are assumed to
cause adverse effects); id. arts. 5, 6.3 (“actionable subsidies,” which require proof of
adverse effects).
154
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter the WTO Agreement].
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How might these two schools of thought approach the task of
constructing domestic benchmarks differently? In theory, the
injury-only school, with its producer-oriented thinking, should find
it quite appropriate to construct the domestic benchmark based on
production costs. After all, the cost of production provides a fair
basis for comparison between domestic and foreign producers. The
anti-distortion school, on the other hand, would not care much
about the cost of production. For this school, assessing the adequacy
of remuneration for the government provision of natural resources
does not involve the issue of rent—whether any rent foregone by the
government may have a trade-distorting potential is not the
concern. Instead, what matters is whether the price charged by the
government for its resources is set at the right level for the optimal
use of the resources. Compared to the injury-only school, the
approach of the anti-distortion school will result in a more
expansive reach of global governance at the expense of the domestic
policy space.155
This more expansive model of global governance appears to
have the support of the United States. Not known for its love of
global governance, the Trump administration has paradoxically
endorsed this approach when it comes to protecting the interests of
US domestic producers. According to Robert Lighthizer, the US
Trade Representative, what the United States wants in trade is “a
system that leads to greater market efficiency throughout the
world,” which he described as “the underlying objective” of
organizations like the WTO.156 To achieve that objective, said
Lighthizer, the United States will take steps to “discourage noneconomic capacity all around the world.”157
There is also reason to believe that the Appellate Body may agree
with the anti-distortion school when it comes to benchmarking.
After all, it is the AB that adopted “the marketplace” as the sole basis
155
It has also been recognized that some government subsidies do not cause
“trade injury,” but may harm the global commons by contributing to the depletion
of scarce natural resources. Examples of such harmful subsidies include those to
the production of fossil fuel and the fisheries sector, which are not disciplined by
the SCM Agreement. See Horlick & Clarke, supra note 7 (discussing the negative
externalities of subsidies).
156 See Lighthizer, at APEC, Says Defending U.S. Market Against Unfair Trade is
Not Protectionism, INSIDE US TRADE (May 21, 2017), https://insidetrade.com/dailynews/lighthizer-apec-says-defending-us-market-against-unfair-trade-notprotectionism [https://perma.cc/AZ7C-HVGY].
157 See id. For a critique of presenting economic efficiency as the purpose of
countervailing duty law, see Zheng, supra note 4, at 46–50.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/2

2019]

Market Benchmarks and Government Monopoly

625

for identifying a benefit under Article 14.158 According to the AB,
“the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in
determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred’, because the
trade distorting potential of a ‘financial contribution’ can be identified
by determining whether the recipient has received a ‘financial
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those available to the
recipient on the market.”159 Moreover, the AB has aimed for an
undistorted-market benchmark rather than accepting the market-asit.160 Given this penchant, the AB may well be willing to accept
benchmarks that are designed to identify and correct distortions in
the subsidizing country.
It should be kept in mind that benchmarking and benefit
determination under SCM Article 14 addresses the issue of whether
a subsidy exists within the meaning of SCM Article 1.1. In the words
of the AB, it is used to identify the “trade distorting potential” of a
financial contribution. Whether such a potential has been realized
(i.e., whether a subsidy has caused injury or other adverse effects to
producers of other Members) requires further inquiries under the
SCM Agreement.161 While a subsidy is disciplined by the WTO only
when it is found to have caused adverse effects to foreign producers,
the different conceptions of the SCM objectives can lead to different
conclusions on whether a subsidy exists in the first place. Under the
broad vision of the anti-distortion school, any financial contribution
that is found to distort the domestic market can be deemed a subsidy
within the meaning of SCM Article 1.1, irrespective of its impact on
trade.
The challenge for implementing this broad vision lies in the
design of benchmarks that will set a price level conducive to
achieving the specific policy objective, based on prevailing domestic
conditions. The subsection below discusses certain possibilities.

158
Historically, an alternative benchmark used by the USDOC was
“preferentiality”, which defines subsidy by examining whether the government
provided more favorable treatment to some than to others within the same
jurisdiction, rather than by comparing government’s provision of goods or services
to the “market.” See Zheng, supra note 4, at 8–21 (tracing the history of evolution of
market benchmarks under US law and WTO law).
159
AB Report, Canada–Aircraft, supra note 97, ¶ 157.
160 See Zheng, supra note 4, at 27.
161 See SCM, supra note 1, arts. 3, 5, 6, 15, 16.
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3.3.2. Benchmarking via Economic Modeling: Example of Land
Pricing in China
In contrast to the construction of benchmarks based on
production costs, which gives rise to the issue of rent, the
construction of benchmarks on the basis of optimal use looks to the
efficient allocation of resources as the sole criterion.
This
benchmarking approach would entail the construction of a
counterfactual situation in which resources are allocated efficiently,
a task for which economic modeling is well suited. Below is an
example showing how economic modeling might help discover the
proper prices of industrial land use in China.
3.3.2.1. Non-Optimal Use of Land in China
Land use in China is divided into two general categories:
agricultural land, which is mostly owned by the collectives of
farmers, and urban construction land, which is owned by the state.
Urban construction land is further divided into several categories,
including residential, commercial, industrial, and comprehensive.
The government controls land use according to planned purposes.
In principle, collective-owned land may not be used for nonagricultural purposes, except when used by the members of the
collective. The State may convert agricultural land into urban
construction land upon paying compensation to the collectiveowners. In recent decades, the conversion of large areas of
agricultural land into urban construction land has enabled rapid
urbanization and industrialization in China. The fast reduction in
agricultural land, however, has prompted the government to
impose strict restrictions on the expansion of urban construction
land, as it views insufficient land for agriculture as a threat to
China’s food security.162
One major problem in China’s land use is inefficiency in the use
of industrial land. According to official statistics, of the urban
construction land supplied in 2016, 23.3% was allotted for industrial
162
The central government has set 1.8 billion mu (300 million acres) of
farmland as the minimum (“red line”) necessary to safeguard food security in
China. See generally Zhang Zhilong, ‘Red line’ policy protects China’s arable land,
CGTN
(Feb.
23,
2019),
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514d316b444f32457a6333566d54/index.html.
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use, 6.7% was allotted for commercial services, 14.1% was allotted
for residential use, and 55.9% was allotted for infrastructure and
other uses.163 The prices of land-use rights diverged significantly
among different types of uses. At the end of 2016, the average prices
for comprehensive, commercial, residential, and industrial land
were RMB3826/m2, 6937/m2, 5918/m2, and 782/m2, respectively.164
While the prices of residential and commercial land have
skyrocketed over time, the price of industrial land has risen only
modestly.165
The low price of industrial land can be attributed directly to
China’s industrial land policy and to the intense regional
competition in the efforts to attract external investment.166 To spur
economic development in the 1990’s, the government adopted the
policy of offering cheap land as a major incentive for private
investment in manufacturing and other production activities. In
response, numerous industrial parks and economic development
zones have sprung up on the outskirts of Chinese cities, turning
China into the “world factory.” Although the central government
has subsequently taken steps to curb the overexpansion of industrial
land, mandating that all industrial land-use rights must be granted
through the market mechanism of “bid, auction, and listing” and
that the minimum price for industrial land must not fall below the
cost of land acquisition,167 it has set the national standards for the
minimum prices of industrial land at a very low level.168 Meanwhile,
local governments are in charge of land use, and have discretion
163
MINISTRY OF LAND AND RES. (CHINA), 2016 ZHONGGUO GUOTU ZIYUAN
GONGBAO [2016 REPORT ON CHINA’S LAND AND RESOURCES] 4 fig.7.
164
Based on data collected from 105 main urban areas in China. See id. at 5
fig.9.
165
According to one study, from 2004 to 2015, the price of commercial land
rose by 20 times, whereas the price of industrial land merely 5 times. See Professor
Zhou Lian: China’s Urban Expansion, GUANGHUA SCH. MGMT. (July 13, 2017),
http://english.gsm.pku.edu.cn/index/en/P9600690371377241735259.html?clippe
rUrl=1495/56296.ghtm [https://perma.cc/AM6F-49AB].
166 See, e.g., Yuzhe Wu et al., Industrial Land Price and Its Impact on Urban
Growth: A Chinese Case Study, 36 LAND USE POL’Y 199, 199–209 (2014) (discussing
attempts by local governments to attract foreign investment through a low
industrial land price strategy).
167 See State Council (China), Circular of the State Council on Issues
concerning the Strengthening of Control over Land (Aug. 31, 2006).
168
The government divided the urban land for industrial use into 15 classes
according to geographic locations and set the minimum pricing standard for each
class. See Ministry of Land and Natural Res. (China), Circular on National
Standards for the Minimum Pricing of Industrial Land (Dec. 31, 2006).
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over the allocation between different uses of urban land within their
jurisdiction. Under the existing system, local officials have strong
incentives to build factories, as industrial production creates jobs,
generates stable tax revenues and boosts local GDP, which has been
the chief criterion for evaluating their job performance.169 The result
has been intense inter-regional competition in the attempt to attract
external investment, driving down the prices of industrial land
towards the minimum level mandated by the central government.170
The low pricing of industrial land has led to inefficient use of
urban construction land, causing the destruction of agricultural land
and the spread of industrial pollution to large sprawling areas
surrounding Chinese cities. The expansive industrial land has also
squeezed out available urban land for other uses, pushing up the
prices of residential and commercial properties in major cities.
Furthermore, overexpansion of industrial land has also contributed
to production overcapacity in China.
In sum, industrial land in China is not priced at a level that
achieves an optimal use of land resources and sustainable
development. This problem is well known to the government. In
its 2013 blueprint for deepening reform in China, the Communist
Party offered a vision for building an ecological system, which
specifically called for “raising the price of land for industrial use”
and for the construction of “a comparative pricing mechanism” to
identify the proper price ratio of industrial and residential land.171

169 See Zhi Wang, Qinghua Zhang & Li-An Zhou, To Build Outward or Upward?
The Spatial Pattern of Urban Land Development in China (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2891975
[https://perma.cc/GCX6-HVGU] (studying the phenomenon that the fastestgrowing Chinese cities have undergone outward expansion of urban land
development with relatively low use intensity); see also Xiao Wang & Richard Herd,
The System of Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers in China 8 (OECD Economics Dept.,
Working Paper No. 1030, 2013) (showing that taxes on businesses accounted for
more than half of the tax revenue of Chinese local governments in 2011).
170 See Wu et al., supra note 166; see also Xialong Zhang et al., Industrial Land
Price Between China’s Pearl River Delta and South Eastern Regions: Cooperation or
Competition? 61 LAND USE POL’Y 575, 575–586 (2017) (suggesting that the regional
competition for attracting foreign investment by low land prices might have
extended to adjacent regions in neighboring countries).
171
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, The Decision on
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform, para. 53; see also The
Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms in Brief,
CHINA
DAILY
(Nov.
15,
2013),
http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/201311/16/content_30620736.htm [https://perma.cc/MAQ6-CXM3].
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3.3.2.2. Developing Economic Models to Estimate the Proper
Price of Industrial Land
To achieve the goal of optimal land use in China, it would be
desirable to estimate the “right” price level for industrial land. In
recent years, economists have engaged in studies on the relative
pricing of industrial and residential land.172 Their research shows
that the supply of land for industrial use in China is significantly
higher than that in most other countries. In China, industrial land
typically takes up 30–40%, and residential land merely 20–30%, of
urban areas, whereas in other countries industrial land on average
occupies 5–15%, and residential/commercial land 60–70%, of urban
space.173 Although countries with different systems and at different
stages of economic development may adopt very different land use
policies, land use planning is common in modern economies.174
Thus, it is at least theoretically possible to estimate the rational price
ratio between industrial and residential land for a specific Chinese
city by reference to foreign cities of similar traits that are considered
successful in achieving efficiency in land use.
The “oversupply” of land for industrial use in China
corresponds to the low prices of industrial land. Utilizing data
collected from different regions, economists have developed various
models to estimate the proper price of industrial land in different
locales. For example, based on an empirical study of 35 large and
medium-sized Chinese cities, Cao and Wang calculated the
equilibrium price of industrial land using the present value of
annual rents derived from the estimated production function of the
land.175 From the equilibrium price of industrial land, the authors
further calculated the equilibrium price ratio between industrial
land and residential land in different parts of China. They estimated
172
For a survey of the various studies, see Song Zhao & Chao Li, Review on
Studies of the Industrial Land Market and Comparison of Industrial and Residential Land
Prices, 29 ZHONGGUO TUDI KEXUE [CHINA LAND SCI.] 4–10 (June 2015). See also Wu et
al., supra note 166.
173 See Zhao & Li, supra note 172, at 5.
174 See generally Land-Use Planning Systems in the OECD: Country Fact Sheets,
OECD
(2017)
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regionaldevelopment/land-use-planning-systems-in-the-oecd_9789264268579-en
[https://perma.cc/W6UA-WXFV] (containing a survey of 32 OECD countries and
their land-use planning systems).
175 See Qingfeng Cao & Jiating Wang, Reasonable Ratio Between China’s
Industrial Land and Residential Land: An Empirical Study of 35 Large and Medium-Sized
Cities, 318 CAIJING KEXUE [FIN. & ECON.] 88–98 (2014).
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that, for the period of 2003 to 2012, the average equilibrium price
ratio of industrial versus residential land should be 0.43, whereas
the average real price ratio of industrial over residential land was
only 0.17, indicating the extent of underpricing of industrial land.
The authors also found that the equilibrium price ratio of industrial
versus residential land varied from city to city, depending on the
specific production structure of the city. Generally, cities with large
industrial bases (such as Tianjin and Shenyang) have a much higher
ratio (above 0.6) than cities without such bases (such as Beijing and
Shanghai, below 0.2).176 One criticism of this study, however, is that
the authors did not evaluate whether the pricing of residential
land—the basis for comparison—is rational.177 Indeed, other studies
have detected structural deviations of land prices in China. The
prices of residential land and commercial land tend to deviate
positively from their theoretical value, as local governments rely
heavily on the sale of residential and commercial land for local
financing, which pushes up the prices; in contrast, the price of
industrial land deviates negatively from its theoretical value
because local governments compete with each other to attract
external investment for industrial development, which drives down
the prices.178
While such studies may be further refined, they have presented
a feasible approach to the construction of market benchmarks
aiming at the efficient allocation of land resources in China. Adding
strength to the method of identifying proper price ratios between
industrial land and residential land is the new government policy to
make all residential land-use rights freely renewable without
preconditions.179 The new policy, once enacted into law, will turn
what are in essence fixed-term land leases into perpetual ownership,
thus effectively restoring private ownership of urban land in
China.180 Following this development, prices of residential land-use
rights will reflect the value of fully privatized urban land, which in
Id. at 92.
See Zhao & Li, supra note 172, at 7.
178 See Bai Xue, Fiscal Decentralization, Intergovernmental Competition and the
Structural Deviation of Land Prices, 276 CAIJING KEXUE [FIN. & ECON.] 49–57 (2011).
179 See China Mulls Law Revision on 70-Year Land Use Right of Properties: Premier,
CHINA DAILY (Mar. 15, 2017), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201703/15/content_28567765.htm [https://perma.cc/G3KB-69KV] (reporting the
statement of Premier Li Keqiang at a press conference that the land use rights for
residential properties “can be renewed without application or preset conditions.”).
180 See Clarke, supra note 149.
176
177
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turn may provide a more reliable reference for calculating the
proper prices of industrial land. For the purpose of benchmarking
under Article 14(d), the approach has the most important virtue of
being grounded in prevailing conditions in China. Aside from using
actual data collected in China—such data have become readily
available in recent years181—the economic models are built upon
assumptions of certain systemic constraints, such as the segregation
of the land market between urban and rural areas, and the
government control on the aggregate supply of urban land.
Although these constraints may constitute ultimate barriers to the
efficient allocation of land resources,182 they cannot be overcome
without fundamental reform of China’s economic system. Until
such reform occurs, it is more appropriate to accept the systemic
constraints as part of the “prevailing” market conditions within the
meaning of Article 14(d).
Similar to land pricing in China, it should be possible to use
economic modeling to construct domestic market benchmarks for
natural resources provided by a government monopoly in any
country, based on the policy objective of optimal use and
considering relevant systemic constraints. In this regard, we note
the extensive research undertaken by the WTO on trade in natural
resources, which examined how markets can help to promote
resource management and sustainable development.183
3.3.2.3. Special Implications for Dealing with Subsidization in
China
The approach of constructing domestic benchmarks via
economic modeling can have broad implications for dealing with
181 See Wang Long & Yang Yang, The Privilege of Power and Wealth: Evidence
form China’s Urban Land Market (Sept. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://zoeyangyang.weebly.com/uploads/9/2/7/7/92771398/china_land.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83SN-FUZE] (claiming the use of representative dataset of
316,320 transactions of land use rights from 2000 to 2016 in 2,300 countries of urban
China, collected from websites of local land authorities and of the Ministry of Land
and Resources).
182 See USDOC, Memorandum on China’s Status as a Non-Market Economy
107–15 (Oct. 26, 2017), https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nmestatus/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP8N-PEXB]
(describing barriers to the efficient allocation of land resources).
183 See generally WORLD TRADE REPORT: TRADE IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra
note 99.
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the problem of subsidization in China. In recent years, grave
concerns have been raised by the United States and others over the
impact of China’s state-led capitalism on global trade.184 Chief
among them is the extensive support the government provides to
China’s domestic industries, which allegedly has caused market
distortions worldwide but cannot be effectively disciplined by the
WTO rules.185 Citing these concerns, the United States and the EU
refused to terminate China’s “nonmarket economy” (NME) status in
their antidumping regimes by December 10, 2016,186 the date on
which the provisions concerning China’s NME status were set to
expire under China’s Accession Protocol.187 Treating China as NME
allows an importing Member to use prices in a “market economy”
country as the normal value to determine whether Chinese products
are dumped (the surrogate country method), which has typically
resulted in affirmative determinations with high dumping margins.
The permission to treat China as NME in antidumping measures is
one of the special rules of China’s Accession Protocol that depart
from the standard provisions of the WTO Agreement.188 In response
to their refusals to terminate its NME status, China filed WTO
184 See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
(2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WT
O%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P84E-E69F] [hereinafter USTR 2017 China
Report]; Eliana Raszewski & Luc Cohen, U.S., EU, Japan Slam Market Distortion in
Swipe at China, REUTERS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/Article/ustrade-wto/u-s-eu-japan-slam-market-distortion-in-swipe-at-chinaidUSKBN1E62HA [https://perma.cc/25RV-4BE3].
185 See USTR 2017 China Report, supra note 184, at 2; see also Mark Wu, The
“China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261–324 (2016).
186 See USDOC, supra note 182; see also Eur. Comm’n, Commission Staff Working
Document on Significant Market Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of
China for the Purpose of Trade Defence Investigations (Dec. 20, 2017)
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6RQ-K6BY].
187
WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO
Doc. WT/L/432, §§15(a) and 15(d) (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter China’s Accession
Protocol] (§15(a)(ii) permits an importing Member to use a methodology “that is
not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China” if the
relevant Chinese producer cannot clearly show that “market economy conditions”
prevail in the industry; and §15(d) states that the provisions of §15(a)(ii) “shall
expire 15 years after the date of accession”, i.e., by December 10, 2016).
188 See generally Julia Y. Qin, ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for
the World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol,
37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, (2003) (identifying the numerous provisions in China’s
Accession Protocol that exceed the requirements of the multilateral WTO
agreements).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss3/2

2019]

Market Benchmarks and Government Monopoly

633

complaints against the United States and the EU respectively.189 The
ongoing litigation promises to be one of the most significant
disputes in WTO history.190
These high-profile NME disputes, however, have detracted
attention from another provision in China’s Accession Protocol that
allows a Member to treat China as an NME in anti-subsidy actions
without any time limit. Section 15 of the Protocol states that “the
SCM Agreement shall apply in proceedings involving imports of
Chinese origin into a WTO Member” “consistent with” the
provision of paragraph (b):
(b) In proceedings under Parts II, III and V of the SCM
Agreement, when addressing subsidies described in Articles
14(a), 14(b) 14(c) and 14(d), relevant provisions of the SCM
Agreement shall apply; however, if there are special
difficulties in that application, the importing WTO Member
may then use methodologies for identifying and measuring the
subsidy benefit which take into account the possibility that
prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be
available as appropriate benchmarks.
In applying such
methodologies, where practicable, the importing WTO
Member should adjust such prevailing terms and conditions
before considering the use of terms and conditions
prevailing outside China.191
Thus, the Protocol authorizes the importing Member to use
external benchmarks in identifying subsidies in China under certain
conditions. Similar to the NME antidumping provision, Section
15(b) recognizes, albeit implicitly, the possibility that “nonmarket
economy” conditions may continue to exist in China after its WTO

189 See Request for Consultations by China, United States–Measures Related to
Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016); Request for
Consultations by China, European Union–Measures Related to Price Comparison
Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS516/1 (Dec. 15, 2016).
190
The stake in this litigation is apparently so high that the USTR warned that
“a bad decision” in this case “would be cataclysmic for the WTO.” Shawn Dannon,
Trump Trade Tsar Warns Against China ‘Market Economy’ Status, FIN. TIMES (June 22,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/4d6ba03e-56b0-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f
[https://perma.cc/2BE2-XWG9].
191
China’s Accession Protocol, supra note 187, § 15(b) (emphasis added).
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accession. But unlike the NME antidumping provision, Section
15(b) does not have a built-in expiration date.192
To date, the importing Members have made little use of Section
15(b). Thanks to the AB’s expansive interpretation of Article 14(d)
in Softwood Lumber IV, the importing Members, especially the United
States and the EU, the two major users of CVD against China,193 have
been able to resort to external benchmarks in calculating Chinese
subsidies under SCM Article 14 without the help of Section 15(b).194
This state of affairs, however, may soon change. For one thing, as
discussed above, the AB’s benchmarking jurisprudence has evolved.
Following its holdings in Carbon Steel (India) that government prices
may be market-determined even when they are set to achieve policy
objectives,195 the AB held in US–CVD (China) that “the selection of a
benchmark for the purposes of Article 14(d) cannot, at the outset,
exclude consideration of in-country prices from any particular
source, including government-related prices other than the financial
contribution at issue.”196 In addition, one should keep in mind that
the AB has never directly examined the use of foreign country prices
as the benchmark for government provision of goods or services
under Article 14(d) in any specific case, but it did suggest a fairly
high standard for such use: the benchmark based on foreign prices
should be capable of “replicating reliably” the prevailing domestic
192
The rationale for the permanency of this provision is not provided in the
accession documents. See generally Julia Y. Qin, The Conundrum of WTO Accession
Protocols: In Search of Legality and Legitimacy, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 369 (2015).
193
As of the end of 2017, of the total of 129 CVD measures against China
initiated by WTO members, 68 were initiated by the United States and 12 by the
EU.
Source:
WTO,
Subsidies
and
Countervailing
Measures,
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/9FZXV3Q8].
194
Although the United States observed that Section 15(b) of China’s
Accession Protocol confirms the permissibility of using out-of-country benchmarks
to measure a benefit in CVD measures against China, it has not invoked Section
15(b) in any of its CVD investigations against China or in any WTO litigation. See
Panel Report, US–AD/CVD (China), supra note 42, ¶¶ 10.9–10.12, 10.26, 10.70. Like
the United States, the EU has routinely resorted to external benchmarks to calculate
China subsidies. For example, regarding land-use rights, the EU has used land
prices in Taiwan as the benchmark. See Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU) 1379/2014 of Dec. 16, 2014, Imposing a Definitive Countervailing Duty on
Imports of Filament Glass Fiber Products from China, 2014 O.J. L367/22;
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/366 of Mar. 1, 2017, Imposing
Definitive Countervailing Duties on Imports of Crystalline Silicon Products from
China, 2017 O.J. L56/1.
195 See supra text at notes 63–65.
196
AB Report, US–CVD (China), supra at note 84, ¶ 4.64.
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market conditions.197 In light of this standard, it may be only a
matter of time before the surrogate country methods are successfully
challenged under Article 14(d).198 Moreover, should the United
States and the EU lose their case in the ongoing NME disputes, they
may well decide to utilize Section 15(b) of the Protocol so as to
continue levying special duties on imports from China. Indeed, to
the extent that the United States and the EU attribute low prices of
Chinese products to “market distortions” by direct and indirect
government subsidies, their complaints should be addressed by
WTO subsidy disciplines rather than by the antidumping regime.199
When invoking Section 15(b), the importing Member would be
required to prove the existence of “special difficulties” in the
application of SCM Article 14 to China, and then to make
adjustments to the prevailing terms and conditions in China before
considering the use of terms and conditions prevailing outside
China. Although the latter requirement is qualified by the phrase
“where practicable”, it remains the treaty obligation of the
importing Member to make a good faith effort to adjust prevailing
terms and conditions in China. This required step—adjusting
prevailing terms and conditions in China—is the same as
constructing domestic benchmarks for China.
It is suggested here that using economic modeling to construct
domestic benchmarks based on the criterion of optimal allocation of
resources in China is one desirable approach to making the
adjustments required by Section 15(b). Normatively, this approach
is fully consistent with the WTO objectives of the optimal use of the
world’s resources and sustainable development. Politically, the
approach is desirable for at least two reasons. First, benchmarks
constructed on the basis of the optimal allocation of resources in
China may help guide Beijing to deepen market-oriented economic
reforms, which is also an official objective of the Chinese
government.200 Second, using constructed domestic benchmarks
instead of surrogate country prices, which is inherently arbitrary,
See supra text at note 40.
For example, it is difficult to see how the USDOC’s use of land prices in the
greater Bangkok area as the benchmark for land 3000 km away in China’s Shandong
Province could have been upheld, had China appealed the Panel ruling on land-use
rights in US-AD/CVD (China).
199
For a recent study of the legal problems involved in the use of alternative
benchmarks in anti-subsidy measures against China, see generally SOPHIA MÜLLER,
THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARKS IN ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: A STUDY ON THE WTO,
THE EU AND CHINA (2018).
200 See supra note 171.
197
198

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

636

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:3

would lend more legitimacy to CVD measures taken under Section
15(b). Due to the permanency of this country-specific derogation
from the SCM rules (for which no rationale was articulated) and the
lack of detailed provisions for its application, the recourse to Section
15(b) can be easily abused in CVD proceedings. Requiring the
construction of a domestic benchmark as a necessary step in the
application of Section 15(b) could help curb such potential abuses.
3.3.2.4. The Role of Economics in Alternative Benchmarking
This Article has proposed two approaches to the construction of
benchmarks where the government has a (near) monopoly in the
provision of natural resources: (i) proxies based on production costs
excluding resource rent; and (ii) proxies based on the optimal use of
resources via economic modeling. Both approaches require the use
of economics instead of relying purely on legal reasoning in the
interpretation of SCM Article 14(d).
Given the economic rationale of trade disciplines, it is not
surprising that economics should play a role in the interpretation
and application of WTO rules. Indeed, economic analysis has
entered WTO dispute settlement in a variety of ways.201 One
prominent example is US-Upland Cotton, in which Brazil used
econometric modeling to establish its claim that US cotton subsidies
caused “significant price depression” of world cotton prices within
the meaning of SCM Article 6.3(c).202 In that case, the AB recognized
that economic modeling is “likely to be an important analytical tool”
in the construction of a counterfactual (i.e., where world prices of
cotton would have been in the absence of US subsidies to cotton),
and that “[t]he relative complexity of a model and its parameters is

201 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Use, Non-Use and Abuse of Economics in
WTO and Investment Litigation, in WTO LITIGATION, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 169 (Huerta-Goldman, Romanetti & Stirnimann eds.
2013); Chad Bown, The WTO Secretariat and the Role of Economics in Panels and
Arbitrations, in THE LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RETALIATION IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 391–445 (Bown & Pauwelyn eds. 2010); Thematic Essay: Quantitative
Economics and the WTO Dispute Settlement, in WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT (2005)
171–211,
www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report05_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95SQ-X3S2].
202
AB Report, US–Upland Cotton, supra note 83.
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not a reason for a panel to remain agnostic about them.”203 While
economics has not yet entered into benchmarking exercises, the AB
nonetheless has made an explicit call for the use of economic theory
and empirical evidence in determining the existence of a benefit
under the SCM Agreement.
Reversing the Panel’s benefit
determination in US–Large Civil Aircraft, the AB explained its
decision in these words:
We recognize that a panel confronted with a measure of the
kind at issue here may have intuitions as to the consistency
of the measure with the market, based on economic theory.
However, we would expect that in such circumstances the
panel would at least explain the economic rationale or theory that
supports its intuition. The Panel in this case did not do so.
More importantly, we are of the view that a panel should test
its intuitions empirically, especially where the parties have
submitted evidence as to how market actors behave.”204
In light of the above, it is reasonable to expect that the AB would
welcome the explanation of rent theories with respect to the
construction of cost-based proxies and would be open to the use of
economic modeling to construct counterfactuals in estimating the
proper prices of natural resources for their optimal use. The benefit
of relying on economics in the application of SCM rules seems clear.
Subject to necessary caveats and limits,205 the use of economics may
enhance the acceptance of WTO rulings by affected parties and the
general public, thereby contributing to the legitimacy of the WTO
dispute settlement system.
The question is whether the resort to economics, as proposed
herein, is feasible in practice. With respect to the application of rent
theory, it would be up to the subsidizing country to propose the
application. To do so, the subsidizing country could engage an
expert economist to expound the basic theory of economic rent in
the relevant legal proceedings, just as Canada successfully did in the
Softwood Lumber litigation under the US–Canada Free Trade
203
AB Report, United States–Upland Cotton (21.5), ¶ 357, WTO Doc.
WT/DS267/AB/RW (adopted June 20, 2008).
204
AB Report, United States–Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(Second Complaint), ¶ 643, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted March 23, 2012)
(emphasis added).
205 See Pauwelyn, supra note 201 (identifying five core caveats and limits:
economics must be filtered through legal criteria; methodological discipline;
keeping it simple; due process; and avoiding or disclosing value judgments).
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Agreement.206 In the event rent calculation is desired,207 it would be
necessary to provide empirical data to support the calculation.208
Major CVD target countries, such as China and India, all have many
well-trained economists and technicians that can help with the task.
The construction of benchmarks via economic modeling, in
comparison, may present a greater challenge. Unlike rent theory,
which is largely uncontroversial, economic models are built upon
certain assumptions that may be unrealistic or inaccurate, thus
exposing the models to disagreement. Politically, it can be difficult
to convince CVD investigating authorities to adopt a new approach,
when their existing methodologies continue to serve their purposes.
But if their current approach, especially the surrogate country
method, is found to be WTO-inconsistent, they may become
amenable to adopt new ones. The question then is technical
capability. The investigating authority would require specialists to
engage in the economic modeling of foreign subsidizing countries.
For the top CVD users (the United States, the EU, Canada, and
Australia209), however, such technical capability should not be an
issue.210
In the event that a case is brought to WTO dispute settlement,
whether by a member suing a subsidizing government directly at
the multilateral forum or by a subsidizing country challenging a
206
The testimony of Dr. Nordhaus on the thesis of economic rent was critical
to the determination by the binational panel in this case. See Decision of the Panel on
Remand, supra note 100.
207
Rent calculation is not necessary if the tax-equivalent theory of rent is
accepted.
208
Rent calculation can be complex, but it is technically feasible. See, e.g.,
Grafton, Lynch, & Nelson, supra note 32, at S47 tbl.2 (Available and Captured Rent
in Wood Products Industry, British Columbia, 1970–1994).
209
From January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2017, a total of 486 CVD
investigations were initiated by WTO members, of which 219 were initiated by the
United States, 79 by the EU, 65 by Canada and 28 by Australia. Source: WTO,
Subsidies
and
Countervailing
Measures,
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/3Q8YUVNC].
210
For example, the International Trade Administration (ITA) of USDOC, the
US agency in charge of calculating foreign subsidies, employs more than 2,000 staff,
including an army of trade specialists, economists, accounting and financial
experts, and business and industry analysts, and has offices in charge of individual
countries and regions, such as China and the EU, which possess expertise in specific
jurisdictions.
See
generally
International
Trade
Administration,
https://www.trade.gov/jobs/ [https://perma.cc/H3RB-JM35]; International
Trade Administration Concordance, https://www.trade.gov/concordance.asp
[https://perma.cc/8WDA-SZ63].
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CVD measure, panels and the AB would have available to them all
the requisite professional assistance. The WTO Secretariat employs
a number of economists and trade specialists for research,211 who
can assist the adjudicators in examining economic evidence and
assessing the quality of economic analysis and models. In addition,
the WTO may engage external experts to advise in specific
disputes.212
In sum, using economics in the construction of alternative
benchmarks is technically viable at both national and WTO levels.
Ultimately, it would depend on the willingness of the members to
adopt the approach.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Government provision of natural resources has provoked major
trade disputes over the issue of subsidies. Yet, how to identify a
subsidy where the government is the sole or predominant supplier
remains unsettled under WTO law, due to controversy over
benchmarking. To avoid circularity in reasoning (where the
domestic market price is the government monopoly price), it is
necessary to resort to alternative benchmarks in the situation.
Although the Appellate Body has articulated certain principles and
made some suggestions, what has prevailed in practice is the use of
external market prices as the benchmark to identify subsidies in the
country of provision. Relying on this approach, the United States
has found countervailable subsidies in the provision of timber in
Canada based on US timber prices, of land in China based on land
prices in Thailand, of minerals in India based on prices of Australian
and Brazilian producers, and of timber in Indonesia on the prices of
timber from Malaysia.

211
As of December 31, 2017, of the total 620 posts (excluding management) at
the WTO Secretariat, 37 were at the Economic Research and Statistics Division.
Source:
WTO,
Overview
of
the
WTO
Secretariat,
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm [https://perma.cc/R6XB7QV8].
212 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU) art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing dispute settlement
panels with the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual
and any relevant source and to consult experts on technical matters raised by a
party).
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The approach of using external benchmarks to identify subsidies
in the provision of natural resources, however, is fundamentally
flawed, as it disregards the most basic source of comparative
advantage of a trading nation—its natural endowment. Legally, this
approach was accepted once by the panel in the case of Chinese land
but has never been endorsed by the Appellate Body. Instead, the AB
has cautioned that it would be difficult in practice to “replicate
reliably” market conditions prevailing in one country based on
market conditions prevailing in another country. The “replicate
reliably” standard, arguably, is the one suggested by the AB for the
use of an alternative benchmark under SCM Article 14(d), which
provides that the “adequacy of remuneration” to the government
provider “shall be determined in relation to prevailing market
conditions for the good or service in question in the country of
provision.” In order to meet this standard, it would be necessary to
construct the alternative benchmark based on domestic conditions.
The question remains as to the specific approach to the
construction of such a benchmark. Applying the economic theory
of resource rent and considering the generally accepted policy
objective of optimal use of natural resources, this Article has
proposed two alternatives: the construction of benchmark on the
basis of production costs excluding resource rent, and the
construction on the basis of optimal use via economic modeling. The
key conclusions are as follows:
(1) Among the several alternative benchmarks suggested by the
WTO adjudicators, a proxy constructed on the basis of production
costs is the most appropriate. That is because production costs
(including costs of labor, capital, raw materials, overhead and a
normal profit margin) typically incur within the country, and as
such, can most reliably reflect the prevailing market conditions in
the country of provision.
In the context of constructing a cost-based benchmark for the
provision of natural resources, it is necessary to recognize the issue
of resource rent. The price of resource products typically includes
resource rent. Unlike components of production costs, resource rent
does not represent any human effort; instead, it arises purely from
natural endowment. According to Ricardian theory, because the
supply of natural resources is limited by nature, the price of resource
products, and correspondingly the amount of rent available from a
resource, is determined by the market demand only. Thus, resource
rent is not part of the production costs for the government provision
of natural resources and should be excluded from a cost-based
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benchmark. Calculation of resource rent in each case, however, can
be complex.
(2) Conceptually, it is more appropriate to characterize resource
rent uncollected by the government as “foregone government
revenue” under SCM Article 1.1, than as “inadequate remuneration”
for the provision of goods under SCM Article 14(d). When the
government is by law the owner of all natural resources within its
territory, its right to collect resource rent is not fundamentally
different from its power to collect taxes. Like taxes, rent does not
represent the value of any productive effort; instead, it is merely a
fiscal instrument of the government to collect revenue based on its
sovereign authority. Thus, when the government does not collect
all the resource rent available, it should be deemed as a situation of
“government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not
collected” within the meaning of SCM Article 1.1(a)(1).
Accordingly, whether the foregone rent confers a benefit should be
determined in the same manner as foregone tax revenue. As in the
case of tax revenue, there can be no market benchmark or external
benchmark for determining what is the resource rent “otherwise
due.” Instead, the benchmark has to be a standard set by the
government itself, subject only to the principle of
nondiscrimination.
From a normative perspective, in a system of public ownership
of natural resources, the government is entrusted to manage the use
of resources in the public interest. So long as the government does
not discriminate among users, any resource rent “foregone” by the
government will benefit the users in the same way as other public
services provided by the government, such as infrastructure,
education or healthcare. Instead of being man-made advantages,
the advantage derived from the resource rent foregone by the
government arises purely from the nation’s natural endowment.
Interestingly, the above analysis merely confirms the wisdom of
draft Article 14(e) of the SCM Agreement contemplated during the
Uruguay Round negotiations. Aimed at the natural resource sector,
Article 14(e) set forth a broad principle: “When the government is
the sole provider or purchaser of the good or service in question, the
provision or purchase of such good or service shall not be
considered as conferring a benefit, unless the government
discriminates among users or providers of the good or service.” It
is unfortunate that this provision, originally proposed by the United
States, was deleted from the final draft of the SCM Agreement
without much discussion.
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(3) As an alternative to the cost-based benchmark, which gives
rise to the issue of rent, domestic benchmarks can be constructed on
the basis of the optimal use of natural resources. The idea is to
construct a counterfactual situation in which the in-country price of
the government monopoly is set at a level to achieve the optimal use
of natural resources and sustainable development. The construction
of such a counterfactual would require the use of economic
modeling, an approach that has already been embraced by the
Appellate Body in the application of the SCM Agreement. The
various models developed by Chinese economists to estimate the
proper price level of industrial land in China offer a good example
of this approach. Using domestic data and accepting certain
domestic systemic constraints, the models were able to identify the
distortion of land prices in different locales in China. In contrast to
external market prices, the price benchmarks produced by this
approach are intrinsic to the country of provision.
Compared to the cost-based approach, benchmarking based on
optimal use is more aggressive in exerting the authority of global
governance, as it aims at identifying and correcting market
distortions within the subsidizing country. This more aggressive
approach can have broad implications for addressing the problem
of subsidization in China. For countries complaining about the
extensive role of the Chinese government in the economy, the use of
this approach would lend more legitimacy to their unilateral CVD
measures against China, especially if such measures are taken
pursuant to the special provisions of China’s Accession Protocol.
For China, the external pressure from the world trading system
could be leveraged to push for further domestic reform, leading to
more efficient allocation of resources at home.
In the final analysis, both benchmarking approaches proposed
herein are consistent with the letter and spirit of WTO regulation,
and either of them would lead to a more reasonable application of
the SCM Agreement than that currently prevailing. Grounded in
basic economic theory and methodology, these new approaches are
capable of producing results that would be accepted as generally fair
and objective, thereby enhancing security and predictability in
international trade relations.
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